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Abstract 
MUSEALIZATION AS A STRATEGIC COMPONENT OF URBAN 
TRANSFORMATION IN 21ST CENTURY ISTANBUL
Paul Benjamin Osterlund
M.A. Turkish Studies 2013
Dr. Halil Berktay
Keywords: Istanbul, urban transformation, public space, gentrification, musealization
Musealization can be defined as the process by which an object is removed or 
detached from its original context or setting for its exhibition in a museum-like manner 
and  environment.  In  the  past  decade,  Istanbul  has  been  the  site  of  various  urban 
transformation projects that are carried out using musealization as a strategy to conceal 
or disguise their non-consensual nature. This thesis analyzes several of these cases, most 
of which are unique to Istanbul's Beyoglu district and have occurred in recent years or 
are  presently  taking  place.  These  cases  exhibit  processes  of  musealization  that  are 
implemented for three objectives: the encroachment of public space, the proliferation of 
consumption spaces, and the displacement of low-income/marginalized residents from 
centrally-located areas. These themes are analyzed within the context of Istanbul's rapid 
population growth as well as its ever-increasing role as a financial center and tourist 
destination.
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Özet
21. YÜZYIL İSTANBUL'UNUN KENTSEL DÖNÜŞÜM'UNDE BİR STRATEJİK 
BİLEŞEN OLARAK MÜZELEŞTIRME
Paul Benjamin Osterlund
M.A. Türkiye Calışmaları 2013
Dr. Halil Berktay
Anahtar Sözcüklar: Istanbul, kentsel dönüşüm, kamusal alan, soylulaştırma, 
müzeleştirme
Müzeleştirme; bir nesnenin müzevari bir tarzda ve ortamda sergilenmek amacıyla, asıl 
bağlamından ya da çevresinden kaldırılması veya ayrılması süreci olarak tanımlanabilir. 
Geçtiğimiz on yıl içinde İstanbul;  çeşitli kentsel dönüşüm projelerinin mekanı haline 
geldi, ki müzeleştirme bu süreçte projelerin rızai olmayan tabiatlarının gizlenmesi ya da 
saklanması  stratejisinin  bir  parçası  olarak  kullanıldı.  Bu  tez  çoğunluğu  İstanbul’un 
Beyoğlu  semtine  özgü  olan  ve  son  yıllarda  gerçekleşmiş  veya  halihazırda 
gerçekleşmeye devam eden vakaların bir kısmını incelemektedir. Bu vakalar üç amaca 
yönelik gerçekleştirilen müzeleştirme süreçlerini göstermektedir: kamusal alanın gaspı, 
tüketim  alanlarının  yaygınlaşması  ve  düşük  gelirli/marjinalize  edilmiş  yerleşimcileri 
merkezi  yerleşim alanlarından  çıkarma.  Bu konular  İstanbul’un  hızlı  nüfus  artışının 
yanısıra  finans  merkezi  ve  turistik  mekân  olarak  devamlı  artan  popülaritesi 
bağlamlarında incelenmektedir.
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INTRODUCTION
Istanbul has experienced a series of vast transformations pertaining to its social 
and structural fabric since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. This thesis 
is  primarily  concerned  with  the  period  following  1980,  which  witnessed  a  major 
military intervention that set the stage for various neoliberal economic reforms. In light 
of these changes,  this thesis  seeks to  explore  urban transformation in  Istanbul  since 
then,  focusing  particularly  on  events  occurring  within the  past  decade.   It  seeks  to 
examine how space is contested as a result of the city's ever-increasing role as a cultural 
and financial capital, as well as a popular tourist destination.  Turkey's largest city has 
witnessed  the  construction  of  skyscrapers,  multinational  retail  and restaurant  chain-
stores, gated communities, luxury apartments, and shopping malls at a staggering rate 
inrecent years.
This has coincided with the rapid redevelopment of urban space, particular in 
inner-city quarters housing low-income residents. Such redevelopment has frequently 
been met with controversy and significant opposition from the public, as these projects 
are  frequently  initiated  from the  top  down without  public  consent.  As  such,  it  has 
become  evident  that  the  phenomenon  of  musealization  has  emerged  as  a  tactic 
employed by the dominant political and financial elite to aid in the implementation of 
such projects. Within that frame, various cases of urban transformation that pertain to 
the last decade will serve as the objects of focus in this thesis. These cases all exhibit 
one  or  more  of  the  three  following  themes:  the  proliferation  consumption  spaces, 
displacement of low-income residents from inner-city areas,  and encroachment upon 
public space
This thesis attempts to explore a phenomenon at the forefront of gentrification 
and urban transformation in Istanbul. To provide context, the thesis attempts to elucidate  
the term musealization and introduce it in the urban realm of Istanbul,  pointing out how 
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other scholars have implemented the term to characterize projects in other cities. It also 
employs  other  concepts  frequently  referenced  in  the  field  of  urban  geography  and 
gentrification  studies.  As  the  focus  at  hand  is  Istanbul  and  primarily  its  quarter  of 
Beyoğlu, some history of the city and the district in the 20th century is provided, for 
readers unfamiliar with the urban history of Istanbul, urbanization in Turkey, or modern 
Turkish  history  in  general.  The  thesis  utilizes  many  prominent  secondary  sources 
throughout  to  provide  this  contextual  backdrop.  The  thesis  also  draws  from many 
newspaper  articles  pertaining  to  the  current  issues  explored  therein.  It  attempts  to 
provide a detailed analysis of the relevant cases, some of which have been continually 
unfolding during the writing process. 
If the thesis were to be expanded into a dissertation, it would involve conducting 
interviews  with  those  involved  or  affected  at  every  angle  of  these  types  of  urban 
renewal  projects,  from  residents,  landlords,  shop  owners,  community  activists,  real 
estate agents,  developers, municipal authorities, etc. However,  at this stage the focus 
was  not  to  conduct  extensive  ethnographic  research,  but  rather  to  try  and  provide 
another perspective regarding gentrification in Istanbul. Much of the literature on the 
subject focuses on gentrification as a consequence or corollary of neoliberalism since 
the 1980's. A great deal of the discussion surrounds the country's  adoption of neoliberal  
policy, although unlike a great deal of literature concerning urbanization in Turkey, such 
a theme is not at the forefront of this thesis. The objective here is to adopt a more  
theoretical  approach,  incorporating  various  conceptual  frameworks  and  exploring 
overlaps and connections among various themes. 
 Musealization  can  be  defined  as  the  process  by  which  an  object  becomes 
detached  or  removed from its  original  context,  for  its  exhibition  in  a  museum-like 
manner  and  environment.  In  Istanbul,  such  a  process  is  frequently  pursued  by 
authorities and other powerful actors in order to justify certain urban initiatives that are 
realised  without  public  consent.  These  initiatives  often  seek  to  suppress,  mask,  or 
extinguish  the  character  and  identity  of  various  spaces,  such  as  the  historical  and 
functional character of a public square, the architectural heritage of a building, and the 
social  fabric  of  a  neighbourhood.  The  five  cases  analyzed  in  this  chapter  exhibit 
instances of musealization. 
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The first chapter discusses two major events in the 20th century that contributed 
to the vast decline in Istanbul's non-Muslim population. It explains how these events 
drastically transformed the physical and social fabric of the city, particularly in Beyoglu,  
a central district of Istanbul and the location for all but one of the cases in this thesis. 
These events are referenced in other chapters since their consequences directly relate to 
some of the recent cases that will be analyzed. The chapter also discusses some of the 
major changes that occurred in Istanbul following a major military coup that took place 
in  1980.  The  economic  reforms  that  were  instituted  following  this  coup  were 
monumental in changing the course of Istanbul's growth and physical appearance. 
The second chapter engages the term musealization, referencing definitions for 
clarity  and discussing  several  articles  that  describe  how musealization  is  used  as  a 
strategy  for  implementing  urban  policy  initiatives.  It  also  engages  several  popular 
themes relating to gentrification and dispossession. 
The third chapter focuses on the theme of consumption spaces, discussing the 
rise of shopping malls and other profit zones in Istanbul over the past several decades. It  
discusses two cases, the first of which describes the construction process (and related 
consequences)  of  a  shopping  mall  in  a  19th-century  apartment  building  on  Istiklal 
Avenue, Istanbul's busiest street. The second case in the chapter is concerned with a 
street nowadays popularly known as Fransız Sokağı (French Street), located in a quarter 
formerly occupied by Greeks, later becoming a mixed enclave with a Roma and Kurdish 
population, which has been redeveloped as a French-themed cultural district. 
The  fourth  chapter  is  primarily  concerned  with  gentrification  and  the 
displacement of the inner-city poor and marginalized. Two Istanbul neighborhoods are 
the focus of this chapter. The first case in this chapter to be analyzed is a street art  
festival which took place in the middle of a demolition area in Tarlabaşı, a rapidly-
gentrifying inner-city neighbourhood. Tarlabaşı was formerly a middle-class Greek and 
Armenian neighbourhood that is currently populated by a diverse population of mostly 
marginalized groups, including Roma, Kurds, West African refugees, and transgendered 
people. Tarlabaşı is in the process of undergoing a controversial urban transformation 
project (initiated under a recent  law which permits the so-called renewal of historic 
areas) that  has led to the demolishing of hundreds of its buildings and the displacement 
of many of its residents. The next case discusses the former Sulukule, a historically 
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Roma neighborhood located in the Fatih district of Istanbul close to the old city walls. 
Sulukule, like Tarlabaşı, was recently subjected to a brutal demolition programme that 
displaced its  residents and destroyed the  majority  of  their  former homes.  Presently, 
luxury apartment buildings bearing a so-called Neo-Ottoman style of architecture are 
being  built  in  the  area,  which  will  ostensibly  be  marketed  to  wealthy  tenants  and 
owners. 
The fifth  and final  chapter  addresses the theme of  enroachment  upon public 
space.  The  subject  in  this  chapter  is  the  pedestrianization  of  Taksim  Square,  a 
construction project  that  is  interconnected  with the  resurrection  of  an Ottoman-built 
military barracks that was slated to be rebuilt on Taksim Gezi Park, which replaced the 
original  barracks  following  its  demolition  in  the  1940's.  Taksim,  Arabic  for 
'distribution',  is the undoubtedly the most significant square in Turkey. The site was 
originally a water resevoir, built in the 18th century to collect water flowing from the 
north  of  Istanbul  so  it  could be  distributed  throughout  the  city.  It  retains  a  similar 
function  today  as  a  transportation  hub,  with  buses,  subways  and  funiculars  taking 
passengers  to  numerous  areas  of  Istanbul.  The  square  is  the  site  of  the  Republic 
Monument, built in 1928, five years after the republic's foundation. Throughout the 20th 
century, Taksim Square has been a prominent centre for mass demonstration. In 2013 
and as of this writing, Taksim Gezi Park, located just behind the square, emerged as an 
iconic  space  since  the  contestation  over  its  future  spawned  large  demonstrations  in 
Istanbul and throughout Turkey. 
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            CHAPTER 1.
A SELECTED ACCOUNT OF ISTANBUL IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
1.1 The Fate of Non-Muslim Communities in 20th Century Istanbul
The urban landscape of Istanbul is one haunted by ruptures in its social fabric 
that it has experienced since the early 20th century.  This began in the years leading up to 
and following the establishment of the Turkish republic.  Formerly home to a robust 
population of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, who collectively comprised just under 50% 
of  Istanbul's  population in  the  late  19th century1 the  city  is  now,  according to  most 
estimates, over 99% Muslim. In a city with a population of around 15 million, estimates 
suggest that roughly 50,000 Armenians2, 20,000 Jews3, and 30004 Greeks remain today.
The bulk of these communities were forced out through a series of policies and 
events  that  were  aimed  at  their  displacement.  They  followed  larger  instances  of 
demographic  engineering  such  as  the  population  exchange  of  1923,  where  over  1 
million Greeks living in Anatolia were forcibly transferred to Greece in “exchange” for 
around  half  a  million  Muslims  who  were  sent  to  Turkey.  Istanbul's  Greeks  were 
1  Rıfat Bali, The “Varlık Vergisi” Affair (Istanbul:Isis Press, 2005), 35-37.
2 Vercihan Ziflioğlu, "Armenians to Build School in Istanbul,” Hürriyet Daily News, 
November 12, 2012, Accessed December 15, 2012 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/armenians-to-build-school-in-istanbul.aspx?pageID=238&nid=35099  . 
3 “Minorities Express Hope Despite Pains of the Past,” Hürriyet Daily News, September 
9, 2001, Accessed May 8, 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/minorities-express-hope-
despite-pains-of-the-past.aspx?pageID=438&n=minorities-express-hope-despite-pains-of-the-past-2011-
09-06  . 
4 Gökmen Köşe, "Gökçeada School New Hope For Istanbul's Greek Population,” 
Today's Zaman, March 29, 2013, Accessed March 30, 2013 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-   311144-.html . 
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permitted to remain in the city,5 although they too were systematically pushed out in 
later decades. The Capital Tax of 1942, which targeted Turkey's non-Muslims, caused 
extensive dispossession of wealth and property which led to tens of thousands of non-
Muslims  leaving  the  country.  The  Istanbul  Pogrom of  1955,  a  state-led  assault  on 
Istanbul's  Greek  community,  saw  the  destruction  of  hundreds  of  primarily  Greek 
businesses,  residences  and  churches  by  armed  mobs,  and  prompted  another  mass 
exodus. Jews and Armenians were also targeted during the riots. Less than a decade 
later thousands of Greek citizens who resided in Istanbul were forcibly expelled from 
the city following heightened tensions between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus. These 
events account for the diminished minority population of the city, in particular the tiny 
number of remaining Greeks. 
The multiconfessional identity of the city, especially in several areas of Beyoğlu, 
where  the  bulk  of  Jews  and  Christians  resided  soon  became  replaced  with  a 
heterogenous  population  including  Roma,  Kurds,  African  migrants,  transgendered 
persons and sex workers. The rapid demographic engineering that forced out Istanbul's 
religious minorities is re-emerging today by way of a series of initiatives which seek to 
significantly rearrange the urban landscape of the city without  consultation of those 
most affected.
Such groups are particularly vulnerable to these so-called urban transformation 
projects, many of which are taking place in Beyoğlu, a district that for centuries was the 
heart  of  the  non-Muslim  community  of  Istanbul,  and  has  re-emerged  in  the  late 
20th/early 21st century as the city's most vital cultural, entertainment and transportation 
centre. Beyoğlu's increasingly coveted status threatens to alter the character of some of 
its  neighbourhoods  which  for  several  decades  have  existed  as  mixed-use  areas  for 
marginalized groups. 
Beyoğlu has long been a district known for its cosmopolitanism and intersecting 
identities. Founded in the 13th century by Genoese traders, the Byzantines referred to the 
area as “Pera” meaning “far away” in Greek, a reference to its location on the opposite 
side of the Golden Horn across from the historic peninsula,  and to the fact that the 
5 Ayhan Aktar, “Turkification Policies in the Early Republican Era,” in Turkish 
Literature and Cultural Memory: "Multiculturalism" as a Literary Theme after 1980 ed. 
Catharina Duft (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009), 46.
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Genoese controlled the area and the trade that took place wherein.6 Ottoman Greeks, 
Jews, and Armenians began to move into the district in the 15th century. By the late 19th 
century, Beyoğlu had become Istanbul's financial and cultural heart, as well as its most  
affluent district, and the site of most foreign embassies. Following the establishment of 
the Turkish Republic, Istanbul was ignored in favour of the new capital, Ankara, and 
migrants from the countryside began to move into the district beginning in the 1950's, 
although the area retained its popularity as an entertainment hub for elites.7 
Following the establishment of the Turkish republic, a series of Turkification8 
initiatives  were  set  into  motion  which  sought  to  render  non-Muslims  economically 
destitute and force them out of the country. In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne officially 
ended the war between Turkey the Allied powers, and established the modern Turkish 
state. Article 42 of the treaty guaranteed certain rights to Greeks, Armenians and Jews. 
The article stipulates that “the Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-
Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures 
permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those 
minorities.”9 Article 42 also made the state responsible for providing “full protection to 
the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-
mentioned  minorities.  All  facilities  and  authorization  will  be  granted  to  the  pious 
foundations,  and to the religious  and charitable institutions of the said minorities at 
present existing in Turkey...”10 However, in 1925, minority groups were pressured by 
the government to renounce these rights, and many Greek members of a sub-committee 
slated to vote on the issue who were opposed to such a move were arrested and the 
motion  passed.  Ayhan Aktar  writes:  “Thus was the  last  vestige of  Ottoman  ancient  
6 Ayfer Bartu, “Rethinking Heritage Politics in a Global Context: A View From 
Istanbul” in Hybrid Urbanism:On Identity Discourse and the Built Environment ed. 
Nezar Al Sayyad (Westport:Praeger, 2001), 133.
7 Ibid., 134.
8 Ayhan Aktar (in Aktar, “Turkification Policies in the Early Republican Era,” 27.) 
describes Turkification as “the way in which Turkish ethnic identity has been strictly 
imposed as a hegemonic identity in every sphere of social life, from the language 
spoken in public to the teaching o history in public schools; from education to industry; 
from commerical practices to public employment policies; from the civil code to the re-
settlement of certain citizens in particular areas.
9 From the official English translation, as cited in a footnote by Aktar, Ibid. p.39
10 Ibid., 39.
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regime abolished, and so, having been deprived of all the priveleges they had derived 
from being  part  of  minority  religous  and  ethnic  communities  and  which  had  been 
guaranteed by international treaties, non-Muslim citizens became Turks from a “legal 
standpoint.”11
However,  the  Greeks,  Armenians,  and  Jews  of  Turkey  were  not  treated  as 
citizens. After 1926, these groups were barred from obtaining public service jobs: 
The Law on State Employees during the single party period gave only ethic 
Turks or Laz, Bosnian, Circassian, Kurdish, etc. citizens who could be Turkified 
(i.e. ethnically non-Turkish muslims) the right to work in public service, thus 
simultaneously encouraging a significant portion of the population to become 
Turks,  and  constituting  a  typical  example  of  the  “discriminatory”  policies 
against non-Muslims.
The Wealth Tax (Varlik  Vergisi)  largely  targeted  capital  of  İstanbul's  Jewish, 
Greek and Armenian populations. The tax, which was established in 1942, was imposed 
for the purpose of raising much-needed capital for Turkey's troubled economy, in light 
of a possible entry into World War II.12 
However, the ulterior motive was the Turkification of the economy through the 
creation of a Muslim bourgeoisie by appropriating capital from the merchant class 
which was almost entirely composed of non-Muslims. Import/export trade and the 
financial sector were dominated by non-Muslims who were often multilingual and adept 
at dealing in foreign trade. The non-Muslim merchant class, who were not trusted to 
fight in the War of Independence, were demonized for allegedly becoming wealthy at 
the expense of the Muslims who had 'shed blood' for the Independence struggle. 13 
One particular example exemplifies the retributive character of this discourse. 
Aktar cites an interview in the  London Times  that finds Şükrü Saraçoğlu,  the prime 
minister at the time, describing the Wealth Tax and claiming that: 
“Turkish  peasants,  have  had  to  bear  the  burden  all  by  themselves  for 
centuries...This law will be applied with all its force against those who, even 
though they got rich thanks to the hospitality shown them by this country, have 
11  Ibid., 39.
12  Bali, The “Varlık Vergisi” Affair, 35-37.
13 Ibid., 39.
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refrained from carrying out their duty towards it in this precarious moment”14 
This discourse  was repeated continuously in debates and discussions regarding 
the tax immediately after its implementation.  The interpretation of the event  among 
mainstream sources, such as an excerpt of an article from the daily Cumhurriyet, cited 
by Rıfat Bali  in his  book “The 'Varlık Vergisi'  Affair” remains the same today.  The 
following opinion piece,  published by the paper in late 2001 mirrors this discourse, 
asserting that:
They [the Jews, Greeks and Armenians] were persons who held monopolies on 
this country's commerce, and thereby became very rich from the monies they  
earned off the people of the country...While the simple Turkish Muslim soldier 
of peasant stock was giving his blood and soul to defend the homeland, at the 
very least these [minorities] also had to contribute by giving a portion of their 
wealth.15
Speros  Vryonis,  in  his  book  “The  Mechanism of  Catastrophe”  refers  to  the 
memoirs of Faik Ökte, the director of finances of İstanbul who administered the tax. 
According to Okte's memoirs, Greeks, Armenians and Jews were added to separate tax 
lists and, via the implementation of a legal loophole, were taxed a rate significantly 
higher  than their  Muslim counterparts.   Estimates of total  appropriated capital  from 
Muslim  firms  fell  under  5%  whereas  between  150-230%  of  total  capital  was 
appropriated from  Armenian, Greek, and Jewish firms.16 Those who were unable to pay 
the  tax on time were  sent  to  camps in  eastern Anatolia  where  they  were  forced to 
perform hard labor as punishment. 30,000 Jews and 20,000 Greeks subsequently left 
Turkey.17 
The Wealth Tax especially impacted the social fabric of Istanbul given its high 
concentration of Greek, Armenian and Jewish residents. The rhetoric surrounding the 
14 Aktar, “Turkification Policies in the Early Republican Era,” 41.
15  Bali, The “Varlık Vergisi” Affair, 60-61. 
16  Speros Vryonis, The Mechanism of Catastrophe, (New York:Greekworks, 2005), 38-
40
17  Ali Tuna Kuyucu, “Ethno-religious 'unmixing' of Turkey”: 6-7 September Riots as a 
Case in Turkish Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 11, no. 3 (2005): 371.
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implementation of the tax portrayed an explicit desire to appropriate capital from non-
Muslims as retribution for their supposed complacency during the Independence War. 
The ultimate goal was to dispossess the non-Muslims of their wealth and property for 
the purpose of creating a new Turkish bourgeosie.  The tax and its aftermath, which 
lacked  any  sort  of  compensation  for  the  disproportionate  harm  it  inflicted  upon 
minorities, sought to inform these groups that they would never entirely be considered 
as citizens.18
In the 1950's, following the victory of  Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and the 
Demokrat  Party,  an  atmosphere  of  religious  nationalism  arose  among  the  urban 
underclasses,  who supported  newly established nationalist  organizations  such as  the 
Nationalist  Turkish  Student  Union  and  the  “Cyprus  is  Turkish”  association.  These 
groups sought to portay non-Muslims in particular as the wealthy other19. The Cyprus 
issue was of major importance in Turkey at the time, as tensions on the still British-
ruled island flared. The Turkish government was opposed to Greek Cypriot rule on the 
island,  and several  popular  newspapers  at  the  time,  namely  Hürriyet, purported  the 
claim that Istanbul's Greek community were sympathetic to the Greek Cypriot national 
cause. 20  
The false news, printed by the daily Istanbul Ekspres, that Greeks in Salonica 
had bombed Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s childhood home was immediately followed by 
violent  rioting  in  Istanbul.  Nationalist  slogans  such  as  “Cyprus  is  Turkish!”  were 
shouted frequently during the mayhem. Thousands of buildings and more than seventy 
churches were damaged, burned or completely ruined.21   More than 30 people were 
killed, and many women and children were raped. Police and firemen were generally 
unresponsive and failed to provide adequate protection during the riots. 22Following the 
18  Bali, The “Varlık Vergisi” Affair, 11.
19  Kuyucu, “Ethno-religious 'unmixing' of Turkey,” 372.
20  Ibid., 375-76.
21  Ibid., 61-62.
22  Vryonis, The Mechanism of Catastrophe, 104-05.
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military coup of 1960, it was discovered that the government played a central role in 
plotting the pogrom, although Menderes had claimed it  to be communist insurgency 
immediately following the riots.23 
Prior to 1955, there was a significant population of Greeks on the islands of 
Imvros and Tenedos (Gökçeada and Bozcaada) however today there are no more than a 
few left. The Greek population of Istanbul is between only 1000 and 2500. The Istanbul 
Pogrom in conjunction with the 1964 expulsion of Greek nationals residing in Istanbul 
formed a two-phase initiative that directly sought to force out the remainder of Turkey's 
Greeks.24 The events of September 1955 occurred throughout in Istanbul (and in Izmir 
an other cities) however the greatest concentration destruction and violence took place 
in Beyoglu, the focal point of the riots.25
These  monumental  events  in  conjunction  with  the  subsequent  expulsions  of 
Greek  citizens  residing  in  Istanbul  directly  relate  to  the  processes  of  dispossession 
discussed in two of the particular cases in this thesis, discussed in greater detail later. As 
such,  having  a  general  understanding  of  the  history  of  Istanbul's  non-Muslim 
communities in the 20th century is crucial to understanding the contemporary dynamics 
of the city, particularly in Beyoğlu. 
 1.2 Istanbul after 1950
As Istanbul experienced significant changes in its social fabric throughout the 
20th century due to the persecution and subsequent evacuation of the vast majority of its 
non-Muslim population, it simultaneously experienced rapid growth and structural 
transformation. 1950 marked a variety of major changes to the urban-rural dynamic in 
Turkey. Tahire Erman writes that beginning in this period “Turkey strengthened its 
economic and political ties with the US, the hegemonic power in the world economy. In 
brief, Turkish society experienced structural and political transformations in the process 
23  Kuyucu, “Ethno-religious 'unmixing' of Turkey,” 362.
24  Vryonis, The Mechanism of Catastrophe, 559-561.
25  Ibid., 136-37.
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of its integration into the capitalist world economy.”26 Following the Marshall Plan, 
agricultural technology became increasingly sophisticated, which subsquently decreased 
the demand for agricultural labor, resulting in rapid migration from rural to urban areas. 
Such migration exceeded the available supply of urban housing, which spawned the 
gecekondu, a term meaning “built in one night”, which referred to the informal shanty- 
housing that rapidly spread throughout peripheral urban areas.27 
As gecekondu neighborhoods continually increased in size and number 
throughout the major cities of Turkey, in the 1960's, they were partially legalized in an 
effort to transform the shanty settlements considered to be in adequate condition into 
formal neighorhoods, which brought infrastructure and services to many of these 
areas.28 Throughout the 1970's, gecekondu neighborhoods came to be known as left-
wing hotbeds. This decade was characaterized by political and economic instability as 
well as violence between radical left and right-wing groups, and in 1980 a major 
military intervention was staged, which led to the imposition of a conservative 
constitution, resulting in the closure of civil society groups, and the imprisonment of 
many who held membership in radical circles.29 
A major neoliberalization process occurred following this coup. The military-led 
interim  government  facilitated  the  implementation  of  an  IMF-proposed  neoliberal 
programme, eschewing the import substitution industrialization-based economy of the 
prior two decades for an export-based model.30  
In “Istanbul and the Concept of World Cities”, Ayşe Öncü and Çağlar Keyder 
write that the 1980 coup 
ushered  in  a  regime  which  was  not  of  the  earlier  type  of  bureaucratic 
authoritarian rule, characterised by more efficient and greater state involvement 
in  the  industrialization effort.  Rather,  this  new regime resolutely applied the 
orthodox  policies  counseled  by  the  IMF  in  the  hope  of  restructuring  the 
26  Tahire Erman, “The Politics of Squatter Studies in Turkey: The Changing 
Representations of Rural Migrants in the Academic Discourse,” Urban Studies 38, no. 7 
(2001):985. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Ibid.  
29  Ibid., 986-87.
30  Aylin Özman and Simten Coşar, “Reconceptualizing Center Politics in Post-1980 
Turkey,” in Remaking Turkey:Globalizations, Alternative Modernities,Democracy, ed. 
Fuat Keyman (New York:Lexington Books, 2007), 205.
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economy towards greater openness and liberalization.”31
In 1981, Turkey's banking sector underwent a dramatic change, as banks were 
now allowed to operate within international markets. In turn, international banks that 
had previously shied away from Turkey began to open branches in Istanbul. Istanbul 
had previously lost its role as Turkey's finance hub following the 1930's, as national 
banks began to leave the city for new headquarters in Ankara, however in the early 
1980's  the  rapid  alteration  of  banking  regulations  once  again  allowed  Istanbul  to 
establish itself as an “international financial center.”32 
A significant actor in transforming Istanbul throughout the 1980's was Bedrettin 
Dalan, who served as the city's mayor from 1983-1990. Mayor Dalan
embarked upon transforming Istanbul from a tired city who's glory resided in 
past history, into a metropolis full of promise for the twenty-first century. Armed 
with a certainty of vision, arrogance, and enormous personal drive and executive 
capability,  he  used  the  vast  powers  and  resources  newly  conferred  to 
metropolitan mayoralities to put into motion a series of urban renewal projects 
which had remained on the drawing board for more than three decades.33
Dalan's  huge  projects  included  the  levelling  of  large  areas  within  inner-city 
historic quarters as well as the demolition of more than 30,000 buildings alongside the 
Golden Horn (the inlet which joins the Bosphorus with the Sea of Marmara.) Despite 
his projects being surrounded by extensive opposition, legal disputes, and corruption, 
Dalan  was largely  triumphant  in  his  efforts  to  remake Istanbul,  which subsequently 
“emerged as the showcase for Turkey's new era of integration into the world scene.34 
 Ilhan Tekeli points out that the rapid privatization of the state-owned sector, 
coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union a decade later instilled Istanbul with an 
upgraded role in the global urban sphere: “Istanbul began to regain functions it had lost 
in the 1920's after the Soviet and Turkish revolutions. These transformations would give 
31 Ayşe Öncü and Çağlar Keyder, “Istanbul and the Concept of World Cities,” 
(Istanbul:Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1993), 19.
32 Ibid., 27-28.
33 Ibid., 28. 
34 Ibid., 28-29.
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Istanbul the status of a global city alongside the megacities of the world, although at the 
time urban planning circles in Turkey preferred to apply the concept of 'world city'.”35 
That  'world  city'  has  subsequently  expanded  at  an  unprecedented  rate.  The 
population, which was just under 3 million in 1980, now officially stands at about 13 
million36, although the actual count is likely to be higher. Staggering sprawl has been the  
consequence of  the  rapid population spike,  which largely consists  of  migrants from 
Anatolia seeking employment in the city with the country's most opportunities. Keyder 
remarks:
Metropolitan Istanbul is already encroaching into its peripheries, in effect adding 
smaller cities to its urban area in a serial manner. It has become a sprawl without 
any clear divide to mark its limits. In official configuration the borders of the 
metropolitan  municipality  have been expanded to coincide with  those of  the 
province;  all  villages and rural  centres have been made into  neighbourhoods 
within the megalopolis. The prospect of endless growth in this same vein is a 
recipe for creating a geographical monster covering the entire area between the 
Marmara and the Black Sea coasts and gnawing into the remaining woodlands in 
the north of the city.37
Keyder points out that Istanbul has been under the governance of the same party 
(the Welfare Party) and its  successor,  the AKP (the ruling Justice and Development 
Party) and its leader (Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan, initially as the city's mayor then later as 
prime minster) since 1994.38 
The  conservative  Welfare  Party,  which  prevailed  in  local  elections  that  year 
exhibited neo-liberal tendencies, interests that coincided with a broad group of elites 
focused on remaking the city as a global city/cultural capital: 
The  new  urban  coalition—the  city  government,  real  estate  concerns,  the  
bourgeoisie in its manifold manifestations, and the top echelons of civil society, 
35 Ilhan Tekeli, “Cities in Modern Turkey,” LSE Cities, Accessed December 12, 2012,  
http://lsecities.net/media/objects/articles/cities-in-modern-turkey 
36  http://www.ibb.gov.tr/sites/airqualistanbul/documents/eng/istanbul.htm (Accessed May 8, 2013)
37 Çağlar Keyder, “Istanbul Into the Twenty-First Century,” in Orienting Istanbul: 
Cultural Capital of Europe? ed. Deniz Göktürk, Levent Sosyal and Ipek Tureli (New 
York:Routledge, 2010), 31.
38 Between 1998-2001, however, the major of Istanbul, was Ali Müfit Güturna of the 
Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party). The banning of the party in 2001 saw its former members 
forming the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and the more hardline SP (Felicity 
Party) Perhaps Keyder considers the Virtue Party as synonymous with its predecessor 
(Welfare Party) and successor (Justice and Development Party) 
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including  the  media  and  the  city-boostering  foundations  funded  by  
businessmen—strived  to  consolidate  the  city  around  their  image  of  
gentility.”39  
 
As  the  city  grows  and  grows,  the  contestation  of  its  centrally-located  areas 
intensifies.  As the cases in this thesis demonstrate, the political and financial elites are 
continuously remaking Istanbul, especially its central areas as a major financial  and 
“cultural” center.   Malls  and banks are spreading like wildfire;  the centrally located 
areas  are  characterized  by  residences  and  spaces  of  consumption  marketed  to  the 
wealthy. In the process, public space and low-income neigborhoods in the centre are 
being targeted. These initiatives are evidently meant to cleanse the city of marginalized 
and poor residents and confiscate public space-A particularly prominent technique used 
toward this end is that of musealization. The term is not frequently used in the greater 
realm of academic literature and there are only a few articles that apply the term to 
urban planning initiatives. Some of these will be discussed in order to better understand 
the term and its application in the context of the city. 
 
39 Çağlar Keyder, “Istanbul Into the Twenty-First Century,” 27-28. 
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CHAPTER 2. Exploring Key Themes of Musealization and Gentrification
2.1 Musealization
Within  the  term  'musealization'  lies  the  implication  of  a  transformative, 
dislocative, or even fatal process. Adorno, in his essay analyzing the differing positions 
of the poet Paul Valery and the novelist Marcel Proust regarding the role of the musem 
in the life  (or death)  of an artwork,  describes such a process,  where the distinction 
between 'museum' and 'mausoleum become blurred:
The  German  word,  'museal'  ['museumlike'],  has  unpleasant  overtones.  It 
describes objects to which the observer no longer has a vital relationship 
and which are in the process of dying. They owe their preservation more to 
historical respect than to the needs of the present. Museum and mausoleum 
are  connected  by  more  than phonetic  association.  Museums are  like  the 
family sepulchres of works of art.40
Embedded in the process of musealization is a transformation based on 
abstraction which is described as one that is threefold: “[1] loss or alteration of 
function, [2] alteration of context, [3] a new relation between the subject (viewer) 
and the object, whereby the viewer takes on a posture of admiration.”41   
 
40 Theodor Adorno, “Valery Proust Museum,” Prisms, trans. Samuel and Sherry Weber 
(Cambridge:MIT Press, 1996), 185.
41 Eva Sturm's definition (translated from German) as cited in: Anja Barbara Nelle, 
“Museality in the  Urban Context: An Investigation of Museality and Musealisation 
Processes in Three Spanish-Colonial World Heritage Towns,” Urban Design 
International 14, no. 3 (2009):154.
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Anja Barbara Nelle, in an article detailing musealization processes in three 
World Heritage towns, describes how musealization is used in the urban sphere, 
referring to each element of the three-tiered definition by Sturm:
 [1] The alteration of function in the urban context signifies a modification or 
diversification of the uses of urban spaces and is related to changes in the uses 
situated in buildings...[2] An alteration of context in the urban sphere rarely 
includes  the  relocation  of  buildings,  but  describes  modifications  in 
characteristics that define the context such as the traffic system (that is, the 
establishment  of  pedestrian  zones),  the  facades  and  street  furniture  and  –
interdependent to the built context-- the people who use the spaces and the way 
they do so... [3] Museality characterized by the 'posture of admiration' occurs if 
there is a pre-dominance of tourists present in the public space.42
Micheal Müller, who describes musealization as a “dislocation of place” also 
qualifies  it  as  a  “current  strategy  for  transforming  urban  spaces,  [which]  exerts 
significance  on  our  social,  cultural,  and  aesthetic  efforts  directed  towards  visible 
reconstruction of the past.”43 Intriguingly, by noting that as museums continue to be 
characterized by the additions of shops and cafes, Müller points out that the process 
plays out in both directions, as “the dissolution of traditional spatial boundaries and 
projection  of  the  aesthetic  perspective  onto  urban  space,  in  which  historical  and 
traditional  narratives  congeal  into  aesthetically  frozen  images,  is  paralleled  by  the 
urbanisation of the museum.”44 
Michael  Kubiena  uses  the  term to  describe  an  urban  renewal  project  in  the 
Macedonian city of Skopje which seeks “to refashion the city to look as if it sprang 
directly  from antiquity..”45 Skopje,  known as  the  “City of  Solidarity”  in  the  former 
Yugoslavia, which had “become a kind of open air museum for for the sculptural rough-
edged brutalist  architecture of  that  time,  and which was produced under a  Socialist 
political  system  that  is  now defunct,  will  have  to  give  way  to  a  different  kind  of 
42 Nelle, “Museality in the Urban Context,”155-56.
43 Michael Müller, “Musealisation, Aesthetisication, and Reconstructing the Past,” The 
Journal of Architecture 4, no. 4 (1999):361. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Michael Kubiena “Skopje 2014-Musealizing the City, Reinventing History?,” 
Western  Balkans Policy Review 2, no. 1 (2012):87.
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musealized city, with a very different aesthetic program.”  46 The project involves the 
construction of a variety of  bridges, statues and monuments, as well as “various public 
buildings, resembling neo-classical or neo-baroque architectural styles, as well as the 
decoration of existing structures with 'classical' facades.”47 Skopje 2014 “fabricates an 
idealized, aestheticized version of Macedonian history, by selectively transforming the 
world of experience into a representation of an ideological  tendency and by erasing 
others—by history being aestheticized.”48 
Kubiena  notes  that  the  Skopje  2014  project  does  not  simply  involve  the 
construction  of  new buildings,  monuments  and other  structures,  but  also involves a 
“number  of  strategically  patterned  silences  and  omissions,  such  as  Macedonia's 
Yugoslav  past  and  the  presence  of  minorities  and  their  cultural  and  political 
manifestations.”49 
“Rethinking  Diyarbakır  Prison:  Musealization  as  a  Resistant  Activism”  by 
Alparslan Nas employs the term within a Turkish context. The article's subject was a 
notorious prison known for torture and human right violations inflicted upon primarily 
Kurdish political prisoners.50 The term in this case is applied quite literally as the article 
deals  with  NGO initiatives  seeking  to  transform the  former  prison in  the  primarily 
Kurdish  southeastern  region  to  a  museum.  At  the  same  time,  musealization  is 
implemented  as  a  process  of  resistance.  Nas  also  invokes  Adorno's  Valery-Proust 
debate, writing that “in the case of the Diyarbakır Prison, the concept of the museum 
assumes  a  revolutionary  character;  not  by  working  through  art  objects  as  Adorno's 
discussion is oriented around, but by providing an after-life to the death and torture.”51
Nas  argues  that  the  process  should  be  dialogical  rather  than  pedagogical: 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 90.
49 Ibid., 96.
50 Alparslan Nas, “Rethinking Diyarbakır Prison: Musealization as a Resistant 
Activism,” Cultural Studies and Literature Blog, Accessed April 4, 2013 
http://zenfloyd.blogspot.com/2011/02/diyarbakr-prison-musealization-as.html 
51 Ibid. 
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“Musealization  is  revolutionary  only  to  the  extent  that  it  does  not  apply 
educational/research  purposes  and  concentrates  on  activating  a  dialogy  between  the 
objects and the audiences in the museum of Diyarbakır prison.52 This case distinguishes 
itself from those described by Nelle, Müller, and Kubiena, who all describe instances 
where  musealization  is  implemented strategically  in  the city  in  order  to  create  new 
narratives,  usually  for  political  and/or  economic  purposes.  Nas  also  explains  how 
musealization can be strategic but describes how it can be rescued from its tendency to 
be deceptive. In the case of the Diyarbakir prison, Nas describes how the process can be 
implemented in order to restore awareness and create new avenues of clarity. 
    2.2 Gentrification, Displacement, Dispossession 
Themes of gentrification and dispossession circle resolutely around several of 
the musealization processes described in this thesis. As such, several of these themes 
will be analyzed throughout the rest of this chapter.
 According to Neil Smith, while gentrification and its causes and effects result 
from various social, political, economic and cultural changes, it is the “complexity of 
capital mobility in and out of the built environment lies at the core of the process.”53 
Smith  points  out  that  the  rise  of  gentrification  throughout  the  1970's  and  80's  has 
paralleled a rise in the literature on the subject, which generally locates the explanation 
of the phenomenon within two categories, cultural and economic. Cultural explanations 
highlight the preference of the city among young urban professionals in light of the 
expanding service sector economy. Economic explanations often involve discussion of 
rising oil prices in conjunction with increased viability of acquiring inner-city property 
as  new  construction  increases  in  the  suburbs.  This  led  many  to  conclude  that 
gentrification had become a “back to the city” movement, indicating that the preferences  
and economic circumstances of the day that largely influenced those preferences had led 
certain  groups  to  return  to  the  city.54 Smith,  however,  refers  to  empirical  research 
52 Ibid. 
53 Neil Smith, The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City 
(London:Routledge, 1996), 51.
54 Ibid., 50.
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conducted  in  Philadelphia's  Society  Hill  neighbourhood  in  the  early  1960's  which 
depicts, rather than a return to the inner city from the suburbs, a “recentralization and 
reconsolidation of upper-and middle-class white residences in the city center.”55
Smith alternative proposes a “rent gap hypothesis” as the key determining factor 
behind gentrification. The rent gap is the margin between potential and actual rent value 
of a particular piece of land or property, the most determinant factor for gentrification, 
which “occurs when the gap is sufficiently wide that developers can purchase structures 
cheaply, can pay the builder's costs and profit for rehabiliation, can pay the interest on 
mortage and construction loans, and can sell the end product for a sale price that leaves 
a satisfactory return to the developer.”56
Another  important  concept for Smith,  the revanchist  city,  is  a useful concept 
worth bringing up within the context of gentrification in Istanbul. The roots of the term 
(coming from the French revanche, meaning revenge) can be traced back to Paris at the 
turn  of  the  19th century.  The  revanchists  were  a  bourgeouis  faction  opposed  to  the 
sentiments of the Paris Commune and the socialist/working class behind it, who had 
seized control of the city following the demise of the government under Napoleon III. 
They were vicious reactionaries who used violent tactics and moralist rhetoric to restore 
their bourgeois vision of Paris.57
Smith applies the term to the hostilities unleashed upon homeless residents of 
Manhattan's Lower East Side during the 80’s and 90’s, where the urban elite projected 
homeless and squatter citizens as invaders who had encroached upon an entitled, secure 
space.58  In 1988, Tompkins Square Park in the Lower East Side was referred to as a 
“cesspool” by the Mayor at the time, following an antigentrification riot that took place 
in the park. The riots were blamed on “anarchists”, and claims of police brutality were 
brushed off by the police commissioner.59  Editorials in the New York Times claimed that 
55 Ibid., 52.
56 Ibid., 65.
57 Tom Slater, “Revanchist City,” in Encyclopedia of Urban Studies, ed. Ray Hutchison 
(Thousand Oaks:Sage, 2009) 
58  Smith, The New Urban Frontier, 213-218.
59 Smith, Neil, “New City, New Frontier: The Lower East Side as Wild, Wild West,” in 
Variations on a Theme Park, ed. Michael Sorkin (New York:Hill and Wang, 1992), 62.
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the homeless living in the park had “stolen it from the public” and that it needed to be 
“reclaimed.”60 Following the closing of the park in 1991, homeless camps throughout 
the city were demolished as were buildings occupied by squatters.61 
 
Smith emphasizes that the dominant discourse on homelessness had shifted from 
“sympathetic albeit often patronizing” to one that blames homeless people for their own 
predicament and for greater social problems.62  However, the revanchist discourse wasn't 
limited to the homeless. Smith writes: 
..the  revanchist  city  expresses  a  race/gender/class/terror  felt  by  middle-and 
ruling-class  whites  who  are  suddenly  stuck  in  place  by  a  ravaged  property 
market,  the  threat  and  reality  of  unemployment,  the  decimation  of  social 
services,  and  the  emergence  of  minority  and  immigrant  groups,  as  well  as 
women,  as  powerful  urban  actors.  It  portends  a  vicious  reaction  against 
minorities, the working class, homeless people, the unemployed, women, gays 
and lesbians, immigrants.63
 Current gentrification initiatives in Istanbul, especially the ones in Tarlabaşı and 
Sulukule that will  be discussed later on, are qualitatively similar to the policies that 
forced out Istanbul's non-Muslim community in the 20th century, insofar as they bear a 
revanchist quality.  Revanchist discourses are employed to cast blame upon a certain 
community,  ethnic,  religious  or  otherwise,  in  order  to  gain  public  support  for  the 
seizure  of  land/property  belonging  to  those  groups,  and  eventually  their  expulsion. 
Musealization then functions as  a  technique  that  attempts  to  mask the  ugliness  and 
violence of these initiatives, softening the blow by applying a thin coat of historical 
manipulation. Smith's rent gap hypothesis is also illuminative in understanding how the 
systematic  devaluation  of  property  and  land  in  these  areas  is  instrumental  in  their 
redevelopment and marketing. 
David Harvey argues that urban transformation almost always possesses a class 
element and as disproportionately harms the urban poor. Harvey describes the urban 
60 Smith, The New Urban Frontier, 214.
61 Ibid., 216-217.
62 Ibid., 222.
63 Ibid., 207.
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onslaught led by Haussmann in 19th century Paris, who “tore through the old Parisian 
slums, using powers of expropriation in the name of civic improvement and renovation. 
He deliberately engineered the removal of much of the working class and other unruly 
elements  from  the  city  centre,  where  they  constituted  a  threat  to  public  order  and 
political  power.”64 Furthermore,  Harvey  sees  a  clear  connection  between  social 
inequality and urbanization because “cities have arisen through geographical and social 
concentrations of a surplus product.  Urbanization has always been, therefore a class 
phenomenon, since surpluses are extracted from somewhere and from somebody, while 
control over their disbursement typically lies in a few hands.”65  For Harvey capitalism 
requires growth through “accumulation by dispossession”, which is “the mirror-image 
of  capital  absorption  through  urban  redevelopment,  and  is  giving  rise  to  numerous 
conflicts over the capture of valuable land from low-income populations that may have 
lived there for many years.”66 
Another worthwhile concept important to Harvey, and relevant to this discussion 
is that of monopoly rent, which “arises because social actors can realize an enhanced 
income stream over an extended time by virtue of their exclusive control over some 
directlty or indirectly tradeable item which is in some crucial respects unique and non-
replicable.”67 Due to globalization, monopoly rents are more difficult to come by as 
trade becomes less and less restricted,  however capitalism thrives on the premise of 
monopoly power and replicate it, so it must find a means to preserve it in a “situation 
where  the  protections  afforded  by  the  so-called  'natural  monopolies'  of  space  and 
locatşon  and  the  political  protections  of  national  boundaries  have  been  seriously 
diminished if not eliminated.”68 
Beyond that, Harvey asserts that 'culture' has become increasingly linked with 
monopoly power, since “claims to uniqueness and authenticity can best be articulated as 
64 David Harvey, “The Right to the City,”New Left Review 53 (2008):33.
65 Ibid., 24.
66 Ibid., 34.
67 David Harvey, Spaces of Capital:Towards a Critical Geography 
(Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 395.
68 Ibid., 398-99.
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distinctive and non replicable cultural claims.”69  The shining example is that of the 
wine industry, which Harvey describes as an industry that seeks to retain monopoly rent 
by refusing to allow widepsread usage of location-specific terminology. He gives the 
example of French winemakers pressuring the EU to forbid foreign wine producers to 
use  certain  French  terminology,  important  signposts  of  the  specific  quality  of  the 
product since “the French wine trade authenticity and originality of its product which 
grounds the uniqueness upon which monopoly rent can be based.”70 
The  notion  of  monopoly  rent  and  its  links  to  culture  are  important  when 
considering a city like Istanbul, recently crowned with the title of European Capital of 
Culture.  How do powerful  actors  seize  control  of  monopoly  rents  in  cities  such as 
Istanbul, which has such a rich and unique history featuring monuments, landscapes and 
views not found anywhere else? This will be an important question to consider in the 
context of musealization,  how are spaces or buildings produced or reproduced using 
particular  historical  initiatives  that  enable  the  consolidation  and/or  production  of 
monopoly rent? 
Leela Fernandes,  in a 2004 article entitled “The Politics of Forgetting: Class 
Politics, State Power and the Restructing of Urban Space in India” describes how the 
implementation of neoliberal policy in major cities such as Mumbai marginalizes the 
urban poor, who are subsequently forgotten and ignored by the state and the burgeoning 
middle class. According to Fernandes, the redevelopment of public space in urban India 
is not simply in response to the desires and consumer interests of the rising middle 
class, but are in fact strategic mechanisms of collaborative initiatives implemented by 
the public and private sectors.71 She points to attempts at privatization of public gardens, 
and the drastic redevelopment (“beautification”) of parks and other spaces to make them 
more friendly to popular middle-class activities such as jogging.72 
She argues that “the state actively participates in attempting to produce a middle-
69  Ibid., 399.
70  Ibid. p.400
71  Leela Fernandes, “The Politics of Forgetting: Class Politics, State Power, and the 
Restructuring of Urban Space in India,” Urban Studies 41 no. 12 (2004):2424.
72  Ibid. 
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class based-vision of a beautified,  globalising city in which signs of poverty can be 
forgotten in both spatial and political terms.”73  The notion of a politics of forgetting is 
pertinent  in  the  discussion  of  Istanbul's  Tarlabaşı  neighborhood,  a  place  that  was 
ignored  and  reviled  by  society  and  the  state  until  it  was  realized  as  a  profitable 
redevelopment opportunity. 
Attention  will  now be directed  to  the  five  cases  mentioned earlier.  With the 
exception  of  Sulukule,  these  cases  all  took  place  (within  the  past  decade)  or  are 
currently taking place in Beyoğlu. They all involve urban transformation to a lesser or 
greater  extent  implemented  without  public  consent  for  the  ultimate  goal  of  profit, 
regardless of the impact on the social fabric and environmental integrity of the areas in 
question. Instances of dispossession, transformation of public space, and the encouraged 
proliferation  of  consumption  spaces  are  frequently  intertwined  within  the  greater 
intention of manipulating and controlling the city. 
         
        
73  Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 3.
    PROLIFERATION OF CONSUMPTION SPACES
      3.1 Demirören Mall and Hüseyin Ağa Mosque
Michael Sorkin, referring to the proliferation of skyscrapers, malls, hotels, and 
chain stores in the American city in the 1980's, calls this new urban form “a city without  
a place attached to it.74 Three characteristics can be attributed to this new city: “the 
dissipation of all stable relations to local physical and cultural geography75, “obsession 
with “security,” with rising levels of manipulation and surveillance over its citizenry 
and with a  proliferation  of  new modes of  segregation76,  and a “city  of  simulations, 
television  city,  the  city  as  theme  park.  This  is  nowhere  more  visible  than  in  its  
architecture, in buildings that rely for their  authority on images drawn from history, 
from a spuriously appropriated past that substitutes for a more exigent and examined 
present.”77 All  three  of  these  characteristics  seem  to  largely  shape  new  urban 
development  in  Istanbul  today,  especially  the  third,  its  architecture:  “Whether  it 
represents generic historicity or generic modernity, such design is based in the same 
calculus as advertising, the idea of pure imageability, oblivious to the real needs and 
traditions of those who inhabit it.”78 
74  Michael Sorkin, “Introduction:Variations on a Theme Park,” in Variations on a 
Theme Park, ed. Michael Sorkin (New York:Hill and Wang, 1992), xi.
75 Ibid., xiii.
76 Ibid., xiii.
77 Ibid., xiv.
78 Ibid., xiv-xv.
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Beyoğlu itself has largely been remade to function as a space of consumption. 
Zeynep  Merey  Enlil  points  out  that  the  pedestrianization  of  Istiklal  Avenue  was 
undergone in order to refashion the area as a new cosmpolitan zone. The street, which 
also features a 19th century-style tram, is the center of area which has been reinforced 
with “fashionable nostalgia.”79
The Demirören Mall and Fransız Sokağı, discussed in this chapter, portray both 
this “generic historicity” and “generic modernity” alike, lacking concern for the needs 
of those living and working in the areas in which they were established. Both are spaces 
of  consumption  covered  with  a  gloss  of  history  and  culture,  unnatural  as  they  are 
strategic.
The  neoliberal  transition  of  the  1980's  quickly  resulted  in  the  rise  of  malls, 
international retail chains and fast food restaurants. By the late 1990's there were over 
1000 foreign retail outlets in the city, the 1990's and the 2000's saw the construction of 
several shopping malls, the latter decade also witnessed fast food restaurants spreading 
quickly throughout Istanbul.80  Asu Aksoy describes how one of these malls, Kanyon, 
(built in a district among various skyscrapers that have entered the Istanbul skyline in 
recent years)  “illustrates how public space has been incorporated into the culture of 
hyper-consumption.81 Following  the  declaration  of  Istanbul  as  the  2010  European 
Capital of Culture, it was declared that Istanbul would become a “brand city”, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan himself stating that the cultural capital  accolade should be used to 
attract 10 million tourists.82
In May 2011, the Demirören Mall opened on Istiklal Avenue, Istanbul's main 
cultural and entertainment artery. The mall was the subject of much controversy. Built 
via the renovation of the 19th century-built Sin-Em Han, which formerly housed two 
cinemas decades prior, its construction extended beyond the height of the neighbouring 
Cercle D'Orient building. The height limit was an initial condition of construction that 
was circumvented through subsequent  legislation.  The construction of  the  mall  also 
79 Zeynep Merey Enlil, “The Neoliberal Agenda and the Changing Form of Istanbul,” 
International Planning Studies 16 no. 1 (2011):21.
80 Ibid., 17. 
81 Asu Aksoy, “Riding the Storm: 'New Istanbul',” City 16 no. 1-2 (2012):102.
82 Ibid. p.103
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significantly damaged the walls and dome of another neighbour, the 16th-century built 
Hüseyin Ağa Mosque.  After a description of the damage to the mosque was published 
in the Radikal newspaper in November 2011, Demirören publicly declared that it would 
undertake responsibility for the mosque's renovation.83 
 The construction scaffolding is  surrounded by walls  of  old  photos  and text 
pertaining to the mosque's  history,  as well  as historical  photos of Istiklal  Street  and 
scenes of the surrounding area. In large letters atop the walls it reads: “The restoration 
of the Hüseyin Ağa Mosque is being undertaken by Demirören Holding”84 The mosque 
is also  musealized as a historic building undergoing renovation, dislocated from its 
(pre-Demirören) status as a functional religious facility where many went to pray. 
Hüseyin  Ağa  Mosque  is  edified  as  a  historically  significant  place,  literally 
masking Demirören Holding's complicity in the extensive damage of what was also an 
operational  place  of  worship.  At  first  glance  the  postered  walls  surrounding  the 
mosque's perimeter present it as an aging artefact deeply in need of restoration, of which 
Demirören Holding has graciously agreed to oversee and finance. The viewer is meant 
to appreciate the historical legacy of the 16th century mosque as well as its ongoing 
renovation, which masks the fact that its musealization was a strategic mechanism. It 
was done to redirect criticism for Demirören Holding's lack of concern for the mosque 
as both a place of worship and a vulnerable building, the structural integrity of which 
they were aware would be compromised if a mall was built next door. 
In April 2013, the restorations came to a halt. It was announced that Demirören 
would not longer fund the mosque's restoration after having alotted 1 million TL for the 
project.85 The self-promoting scaffolding still surrounds the area. At present, it is unclear 
when  and  if  the  Hüseyin  Ağa  Mosque  will  return  to  its  functional  status.  The 
musealization of the mosque was rooted in violence and destruction. However, the same 
process  seeks  to  conceal  that  violence  and subsequently  bury it  within the  positive 
context of a restoration project. The unwillingness of the company to see the restoration 
83 Tuba Parlak, “Renovation Ongoing at Damaged Ağa Mosque,” Hurriyet Daily News, 
May 12, 2012, Accessed December 12, 2012 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/renovation-
ongoing-at-damaged-aga-mosque.aspx?pageID=238&nid=20692 
84 My own translation from the Turkish
85 Fatih Yagmur, “Ağa Cami Restorasyonu Kaynağa Takıldi,” Radikal, April 28, 2013, 
Accessed May 23, 2013 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/aga_camii_restorasyonu_kaynaga_takildi-1131356 
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through reveals its frail attempt to occupy a position of accountability. 
Hüseyin Ağa Mosque wasn't the mall's only neighbour that experienced severe 
damage during  the construction period. The owner of Ağa Lokantası, a restaurant that 
opened in 1920,  rebuked requests to  sell  his  property,  so developers  began digging 
under numerous sides of the restaurant, forcing the owner to eventually sell out of fear  
that the building would collapse. Finally, the remarks of a security guard working at the  
mall provide insight on how the Demirören building itself is musealized. “It’ll take only 
a year or two for the shopping centre to be as black as the [Cercle d’Orient] building 
next to it. In fifty years, this will also be a historical building; nobody will even notice 
the difference.”86
These comments are interesting given photos  found near the entrance  of  the 
mall, one of which is an old black-and-white photo depicting the late-19th century Sin-
Em Han building (which was also known as the Deveaux Apartments) several decades 
after  its  construction.  Below  is  a  photo  taken  from  roughly  the  same  perspective, 
although it depicts the sparkling white Demirören, which is portrayed as an updated, 
restored, modern, yet faithful-to-the-original version of its former self. The first photo 
reads “Deveaux Apartments, 1890 before the fire”, depicting the building shortly after 
its  construction.  The  second  photo  reads  “Demirören  Istiklal,  the  entire  glory  of 
Deveaux lives on.”87 (see figure 3.2) The photo implies that the mall, much like how a 
museum preserves artefacts or artworks, preserves the original aura and style of the 
building and acts as its protectorate, ensuring its immortality. 
86 The account of Ağa Lokantası as well as the security guard's comments are from a 
detailed account of the mall and the controversy surrounding its construction: Letch, 
Constanze “Digging Deeper-Istiklal Caddesi Controversial New Shopping Centre,” 
Accessed December 12, 2012 http://www.tarlabasiistanbul.com/2011/05/istiklal-demiroren/  
87 My own translation from Turkish. 
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Figure 3.1 Outside Demirören Mall (Source: authors's photograph) 
The photographs present the mall as part of a historical continuum. It is as much 
of an 'invented tradition' as is the rebuilding of the British Parliament in a 19th-century 
Gothic Style as described by historian Eric Hobsbawm, where repetition of behaviours, 
norms, and practices (in this case the replication/preservation of an architectural style) 
are established to demarcate continuity with a historical past.  Hobsbawm points out that 
this continuity is usually fabricated.88 
Such  is  the  case  with  the  Demirören  mall,  although  as  suggested  by  the 
comments of the security guard, in fifty years the brand new and glossy-white mall will 
88 Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction, Inventing Traditions,” in The Invention of  Tradition, 
ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 
1983,) 1-2.
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have lost its lustre and taken on an aura similar to its predecessor, writing itself into the 
historical fabric of a building with which it bears no organic and essential similarity.  
The  construction  of  the  huge  mall,  undergone  without  consideration  of  the 
neighbouring business owners or the architectural integrity of neighbouring buildings, 
articulates another identity preference held by the political and financial elite. It portrays  
their shared vision of what the city should be: a place free to exhibit signs of its physical 
and architectural heritage, so long as it benefits their interests and functions according to 
their decisions. 
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Figure 3.2 Near Demiroren Malls Entrance (source: author's photograph)
The mall  features  numerous floors,  restaurants,  cafes,  a  movie theatre  and a 
home electronics store that takes upon an entire  floor.  The entry floor,  patrolled by 
security personnel, is a wide and open entrance revealing the ultra-modern shopping 
center to all passersby. However, the entrance seems to be inviting and cautious at the 
same time, by displaying the mall for all to see, with its escalators, security guards, and 
upscale cafes, the invitation is open only to visitors within an intended demographic.  
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The neighbouring Cercle D' Orient building began to experience a similiar fate 
at the end of 2012. İnci Pastanesi, a reknowned and beloved profiterol shop that opened 
in 1944, was evicted from the building. Inci was that the last remaining storefront in the 
Cercle D' Orient building, cherished by locals and popular among visitors. The pastry 
shop was gutted on a cold winter day  in  December 2012,  numerous onlookers  and 
passersby stared in disbelief, incredulous that the Istiklal Caddesi institution was being 
destroyed before their eyes. The eviction, forced via lawsuit from Kamer İnşaat, the 
firm overseeing the “renovation” of the Cercle D' Orient was upheld by the Supreme 
Court, in spite of an appeal from İnci.89
The  historic  Emek  Cinema,  also  located  within  the  Cercle  D'  Orient,  was 
demolished  in  April  2013  in  spite  of  numerous  protests,  included  one  attended  by 
numerous prominent  Turkish actors and directors.  This  demonstration was met with 
aggresssion, as police sprayed water and tear-gassed the demonstrators. The reaction of 
the police faced intensive criticism,  although Interior Minister Muammer Güler  was 
quick to blame the escalation on protestors.90  
The theatre, built in 1924, was demolished as the Cercle D'Orient is planned to 
be transformed into a  shopping center  much like its  neighbor.  Following the initial 
demolition  of  the  interior  of  the  theatre,  the  building's  exterior  was  covered  with 
wallpaper that echoed the original facade of the building, albeit in a revitalized, sparkly-
clean appearance. Gone are İnci and Emek, their replacements are sure to be corporate 
coffeeshops  and  an  ultramodern  cinema,  similar  to  those  found  next  door  at  the 
Demirören Mall. The notion of two shiny new shopping malls with cafes and cinemas 
directly next door to each other is almost comic in a darkly revealing manner. Such 
excessiveness is symbolic of the extent to which spaces of consumption have become 
prevalent throughout Istanbul. 
89  “Historical Patisserie Closed Down Amid Protests,” Hürriyet Daily News, December 
8, 2012, Accessed December 12, 2012 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/historical-patisserie-
closed-down-amid-protests.aspx?pageID=238&nID=36394&NewsCatID=341 
90  “Interior Minister Blames Provocateurs For Emek Clash,” Hürriyet Daily News,   
April 9, 2013, Accessed April 9, 2013  http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/interior-
minister-blames-provocateurs-for-emek-clash-.aspx?
pageID=238&nID=44557&NewsCatID=341  
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3.2 Fransız/Cezayir Sokağı
The Fransız Sokağı project of 2004 sought to refurbish Cezayir Sokak (Algeria 
Street),  a sloping street in Beyoğlu located just behind the famous Galatasaray High 
School in order to create a quarter similar to one found in late 19th century Paris. To this 
end, the street features numerous French-themed murals on the walls of cafes serving 
French-themed  food  and  drink;  the  gas-powered  street  lamp  lining  the  street  were 
actually sent by the Paris City Hall.91
 Amy Mills  notes  the  irony  of  naming  the  project  'French'  Street,  given its 
original name, Algeria Street. Once a Greek neighborhood, most of the buildings on the 
street were uninhabited, unable to be maintained by the landlords who took over the 
buildings following the expulsion of Greeks in 1964.92  Though the project was framed 
as a reconnection with a certain European or French historical past, the neighbourhood 
on which Fransız Sokağı is situated has no French past. It was however, in recent years, 
a mixed neighbourhood including a Roma and Kurdish population, many of whom were 
intimidated out of their homes by threats of eviction or rent increase, and were never 
informed about the project in the first place.93
Fransız Sokağı is a profitable venture for those involved in its creation, as the 
street  and its  cafes  are  popular,  especially  among  tourists.  It  is  also  an  exercise  in 
musealization,  a  near-simulacrum of  a  street  one might  find  in  Paris.  However,  the 
cultural and historical reasoning employed seeks to gloss over the forced evictions and 
drastic  transformation  of  an  area  from  a  mixed-used  neighbourhood  to  a  zone  of 
consumption enjoyed mainly by tourists. Visiting the street on any busy evening will 
find one in the midst of a crowd primarily consisting of tourists. If one is willing to  
conceive of the street as an “architectural monument” of sorts, Müller's remarks seem 
quite  appropriate:  “Cultural  politics  regarding regional  or  local  history  embodied in 
architectural monuments are usually not much concerned about those who live there. 
91  Sara Harowitz, “A Slice Of Paris in Istanbul,” Cultour Magazine, Accessed May 8, 
2013 http://www.schoolvoorjournalistiek.com/europeanculture/?p=3978
92 Amy Mills, “Narratives in City Landscapes: Cultural Identity in Istanbul,” 
Geographical Review 95 no.3 (2005):454.
93   Ibid,. 454-456.
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They  are  not  designed  to  please  the  locals,  but  primarily  to  take  into  account  the 
imperatives of the tourist industry, to attract people who will bring money...”94 
The choice  of  France  as  the  cultural  theme is  not  surprising,  given the  vast 
cultural  influence  France  has  had on Turkey.  Modern Turkish contains  a significant 
amount of French loanwords (the words for train, ticket, truck, waiter, campus, to name 
a  few).  There  are  numerous  French  high  schools  in  Istanbul,  as  well  as  a  French 
university, Galatasary Üniversitesi. The cultural and historic ties make the French theme 
of the project an attractive choice in Beyoğlu. 
Nevertheless,  the  street,  with  its  real  Parisian  streetlights  and  constructed 
Parisian charm, is a textbook case of musealization. Refering to the famous Parisian 
quarter, Asu Aksoy describes it as a “gaudy fake Monmartre”, noting that the “Beyoğlu 
Municipality was the first to allow private developers to turn an entire street in a run-
down part of the centrally-located Pera district into a themed street, based on a French
—in reality, a pseudo-French—lifestyle.”95  
As a living, breathing exhibition, it  gives the spectator what appears to be a 
genuine French atmosphere, assuming the spectator doesn't ask any questions. A brief 
walk down the street reveals a crowd of mostly older tourists, who are able to breathe in 
a  little  bit  of  Paris  during their  short  visit  in  Istanbul.  The genuine streetlights  and 
French artwork adorning the walls of the 19th century buildings imply that “this is how it 
always was.” It seeks to capture what was once a real segment of the urban landscape,  
and sever it  from its  previous two contexts,  (a Greek neighbourhood followed by a 
mixed enclave of Kurds and Roma). By doing so, it masks the historical reality of that 
particular landscape, the fact that the Greeks and later on, the Roma, Kurds, and other 
residents  of  the  neighbourhood  were  forcibly  relocated.  These  identities  are  to  be 
suppressed so that the quarter  can be re-claimed and re-developed. One particularly 
effective way of  doing so is  by decorating the urban fabric  with  physical  elements 
pertaining to a specific yet separate cultural identity, around which a profitable zone of 
consumption  can  be  constructed.  As  Mills  points  out:  “..the  French  Street  project 
deliberately  inscribes  a  French  identity  onto  the  urban  landscape,  even  though  the 
94 Müller, “Musealisation, Aesthetisication, and Reconstructing the Past,” 365. 
95 Aksoy, “Riding the Storm: 'New Istanbul',” 102.
34
history  this  commercial  development  claims  to  “revive”  is  completely  synthetic.”96 
What is most important about Fransız Sokağı, beyond its museal character and existence  
as a recently-built consumption space is how in relates to the themes in the next chapter, 
with  regards  to  Tarlabaşı.  In  both  cases,  a  formerly  non-Muslim  quarter  that  was 
replaced by marginalized groups after the previous residents left the neighborhood (and 
the country) experiences another wave of redevevelopment via dispossession.
 
96 Mills, “Narratives in City Landscapes,” 457.
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CHAPTER 4.
 MARGINALIZATION AND DISPLACEMENT: TWO NEIGHBOURHOODS 
Tolga Islam locates three particular waves of gentrification in Istanbul, the first 
of  which  began in  the  1980's  in  quarters  located  alongside the  Bosphorus,  such as 
Kuzguncuki, Arnavutköy, and Ortaköy.97 The second wave began in the late 1980's in 
Beyoğlu quarters like Cihangir and Galata  98, while the third wave took place in the 
1990's in the Golden Horn neighborhoods of Fener and Balat.99 Islam notes that most of 
the housing stock in  each of those neighorhoods were former Greek, Armenian and 
Jewish  residences.  After  these  minorities  left  the  city  they  were  replaced  by  rural 
migrants in the 60's and 70's who were unable to maintain or improve upon this housing 
stock. As a result, “social decline was followed by physical decay, which led to further 
deterioration and devaluation. By the 1980's, these old minority neighborhoods became 
apt places for gentrification,  with the easily 'displaceable'  occupants and inexpensive 
housing stock they possess.”100
Keyder argues that since the globalization process began in the 1980's, dynamics 
of  class  and  social  inequality  have  changed  drastically,  as  “globalized  spaces  of 
commerce and leisure emerged along with secluded residential areas on the outskirts of 
the city.”101 With the emergence of these new spatial and social dynamics, Istanbul is 
now witnessing “Latin American levels of income inequality—such as scavenging in 
97 Tolga Islam, “Outside the Core: Gentrification in Istanbul” in Gentrification in a 
Global Context ed.  Rowland Atkinson and Gary Bridge (New York:Routledge, 
2005), 127.
98 Ibid., 128.
99 Ibid., 129-30.
100 Ibid., 124.
101 Çağlar Keyder “Globalization and Social Exclusion in Istanbul,” International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 29 no.1 (2005):124.
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garbage  bins,  the  cartonero  phenomenon  of  collecting  salvageables  in  wealthier 
neighborhoods, and street children at busy intersections attacking SUV's with squeegees
—have become increasingly common.”102
 Such  spaces  include  gated  communities,  which  have  appeared  on  the  urban 
landscape  of  Istanbul  in  recent  years.  Zeynep  Merey  Ensil  points  out  that  these 
communitites  have  popped  up  on  the  outskirts  in  close  proximity  to  gecekondu 
neighborhoods, although the new structures have created elements of physical and social 
segregation which previously did not exist in Istanbul.103
The next two cases concern the agressive gentrification projects in two Istanbul 
neighborhoods. Tarlabaşı,  located in the center  of Beyoğlu is  inner-city in the truest 
sense of the term. Sulukule, located in the Fatih District near the old city walls, can also 
be considered “inner-city” in the context of a 21st century Istanbul that has expanded in 
every direction, as the city now encompassing the entire Istanbul region. Both cases are 
similar insofar as they deliberately seek to displace poor and marginalized groups in 
order to construct entirely new neighborhoods that are marketed to the upper classes. 
The background and recent history of these neighborhoods will be discussed alongside 
the musealization efforts  that  have corresponded with the brutal and non-consensual 
gentrification initiatives. Although Sulukule is not located in Beyoğlu, unlike Tarlabaşı 
and the other sites analyzed in this thesis, I felt that it should not be left out of the 
discussion  as  it  overlaps  in  numerous  ways  with  the  Beyoğlu  cases  and  the  three 
referential themes.
4.1 Renovation Tarlabaşı
“Renovation Tarlabaşı” took place in the Tarlabaşı neighbourhood in September 
2012. This street art festival will be discussed in the greater context of the Tarlabaşı 
neighbourhood itself  and the so-called urban renewal project  that is  currently taking 
place in the area. Tarlabaşı, located in the heart of Istanbul, was formerly a middle-class 
Greek and Armenian neighbourhood. It became a popular place for marginalized groups 
to live (primarily Roma, Kurds, African migrants, and transgendered people) following 
102 Ibid.
103 Enlil, “The Neoliberal Agenda and the Changing Form of Istanbul,” 19.
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the Wealth Tax and the September 6th and 7th riots that forced out the majority of its 
former community.104 
The formerly non-Muslim-owned apartment buildings were legally transfered to 
a set of newcomer landlords by the state following the expulsion of their former owners. 
According to Ünsal and Kuyucu, “rural migrants mostly benefited from this process 
either by purchasing the buildings from their official caretakers (kayyum) or by extra-
legally  appropriating  them  and  retroactively  becoming  legal  'owners'.”  Shortly 
thereafter, “a lucrative rental market emerged in the area, where the new owners rented 
out extra-dwellings, either formally or informally. According to resesarch conducted in 
the  project  area,  75  per  cent  of  Tarlabaşı's  inhabitants  are  tenants,  20  percent  are 
property owners and the remaining 5 percent are occupiers.”105 
In the late 1980's, Mayor Bedrettin Dalan demolished hundreds of buildings in 
Tarlabaşı in order to create a major road connecting developing areas between the city 
centre and the airport. By effectively sectioning off the area from the rest of the district, 
these initiatives accelerated the socio-economic and structural decline of the quarter in 
the  1990's.106 Tarlabaşı  is  presently  the  site  of  an  aggressive  and  controversial 
gentrification project that seeks to displace its current residents and remake the area into 
a chic bourgeois enclave complete with modern cafes and office buildings. This project 
is made possible by Law No. 5366.
Law No. 5366, passed in 2005, is officially entitled the “Law on Renovating, 
Conserving, and Actively Using Dilapidated Historical and Cultural Immovable Assets.” 
It allows municipalities to redevelop areas “which have been dilapidated and are about 
to  lose  their  characteristics,  create  zones  of  housing  business,  culture,  tourism,  and 
social facilities in such areas, take measures against risks of natural disasters, renovate, 
104 Nil Mutluer, “Disposable Masculinities in Istanbul,” in Global Masculinities and 
Manhood  ed. Ronald L. Jackson and Murali Balaji (Champaign:University of 
Illinois Press, 2011), 82.
105 Tuna Kuyucu and Özlem Ünsal, “Challenging the Neoliberal Urban Regime: 
Regeneration and Resistance in Basibuyuk and Tarlabasi,” in Orienting 
Istanbul:Cultural Capital of Europe? ed. Deniz Göktürk, Levent Soysal and Ipek 
Tureli (New York:Routledge, 2010), 57.
106 Ibid.
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conserve and actively use historical  and cultural  immovable assets.”107 The law also 
allows municipalities to expropriate private property from owners if a settlement is not 
reached108
Today,  a  blog109 that  follows the  gentrification  process  in  Tarlabaşı  provides 
insight into the flourishing community of the neighborhood. The neighborhood features 
one of the most popular Sunday markets in the city, which reflects the diversity and 
community linkages of the neighborhood.  However,  these sides of Tarlabaşı are not 
highlighted in the majority of the information available regarding the neighborhood. It 
is  difficult  to  find  any  information  regarding  Tarlabasi  that  doesn’t  refer  to  the 
neighborhood  as  a  center  of  crime  and  squalor.  Print  media  as  well  as  books  and 
scholarly articles that mention Tarlabaşı refer to poverty, violence, crime, and suffering, 
often in a sensational fashion which emphasizes those attributes as the neighborhood's 
defining  chacateristics.  For  example,  a  recent  book  by  Peter  Clark  describes  the 
neighborhood  as  follows:  “Tarlabaşı  is  one  of  the  grimmest  quarters  of  Istanbul: 
tenement buildings of an undistinguished design, poverty stricken people, squalor in the 
streets.”110
Newspaper articles often highlight tensions among different groups as a defining 
feature of the quarter, or seek to portray it as a seedy-red light district, emphasizing the 
presence of transgendered residences and demonizing their professions. According to 
Nil  Mutluer,  the  neighborhood has  been stigmatized  since  the  1940's,  following the 
mass exodus of non-Muslims from the area in light  of both the Wealth Tax and the 
events of September 6th and 7th. The subsequent groups who came to reside in Tarlabaşı 
are subject to specific stigmatization; Kurds as terrorists, Roma as criminals, African 
migrants as drug dealers. Authorities and other actors perpetuate these stigmas in order 
to create the perception of a “homogenized criminal community.”111
One  article,  in  which  the  expatriate  author  claims  to  enjoy  living  in  the 
107 http://www.migm.gov.tr/en/Laws/Law5366_DilapidatedHistoricAssets_2010-12-31_EN_rev01.pdf 
Accessed February 20, 2012
108 Ibid.
109 www.tarlabasiistanbul.com
110 Peter Clark, “Istanbul: A Cultural History,” (Northampton:Interlink, 2012), 210.
 
111 Mutluer, “Disposable Masculinities in Istanbul,” 82.
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neighborhood  still  seems  to  focus  on  the  negative,  albeit  in  a  whimsical  and 
condescending fashion: 
And Tarlabaşı can be exciting. Last December, a court in Ankara closed down 
the  main  Kurdish  political  party,  leading  to  riots  in  İstanbul  and  in  thes  
outheast of Turkey. Our Tarlabaşı police station always barricades our block in 
the event of trouble, and as I stood outside I saw three policemen point down the 
hill and start running back to the station. Then I saw what looked like a scene 
from a Frankenstein movie, with angry villagers carrying torches, only these  
were Molotov cocktails. I stepped inside and POOF, one landed at my door,  
followed by a BANG, then the skittering of tear gas canisters on the pavement. I 
love Tarlabaşı.112
In  Tarlabaşı,  demolitions  began  in  early  2012.  Nearly  a  year  later,  the 
demolitions have not been succeeded by any sort of new construction, and the section of 
Tarlabaşı  affected  resembles  a  war  zone,  as  numerous  buildings  have  been  gutted, 
leaving only the facades, which are left to experience further degradation and filled with 
trash that is not collected by municipality trucks. Graffitti and street art has steadily 
appeared amidst the gutted buildings. Several streets reveal rows gutted facades which 
lie directly across from presently-inhabited apartment buildings. Children play in and 
around shells  of buildings from which scattered debris frequently falls. No apparent 
concern for the safety and comfort of the residents neighbouring the demolition area is 
evident. In August 2012, corrugated metal fencing was erected around the facades on 
Sakı Ağaçı Sokak, a main thoroughfare passing through the center of the demolition 
zone. The fencing in conjunction with the gutted buildings and excessive debris creates 
an intimidating siege-like environment. The boundary of the fencing juts out onto the 
street, creating a narrow corridor that is dangerous for pedestrians to pass through since 
there is just enough room left for cars to zip by.  
Prior  to  the  demolitions,  the  Mayor  of  Beyoğlu,  Ahmet  Misbah  Demircan, 
claimed that up to 70% of the buildings in the demolition zone were vacant and that the 
vacancy exacerbated crime in the area. However, figures from the construction company 
in charge of the project actually revealed that only 40% of the area's buildings were 
112 Michael Kuser, “I Used to Hate Tarlabaşı” Today's Zaman, August 29, 2010, 
Accessed April 12, 2013
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uninhabited, the remainder were either homes or workplaces.113 Demircan also claimed 
that the new Tarlabaşı will turned into the Champ Elysees114, referring to the famous 
boulevard  in  Paris  known for  its  shopping.  It  is  clear  that  local  authorities wish to 
transform Tarlabaşı into an unrecognizable place,  showing no interest in the current 
social reality of its inhabitants or their future concerns. 
“Renovation Tarlabaşı”  was sanctioned by the municipality  and backed by a 
score of corporate donors. It featured different types of artists from Turkey and six other 
countries, in additon to music and dance performances, DJ's, and other activities.  115 It 
took place on Karakurum Sokak, down the street from the Virgin Mary Syriac Church. 
The facades and interior walls of a dozen or so 19th century Greek buildings, which had 
been gutted during the ongoing demolitions on Tarlabaşı, were adorned with various 
paintings and stencils. One particularly troubling stencil was of a recycler and his cart. 
Recyclers are visible throughout Istanbul, they comprise thousands of men and women 
who walk the streets pulling large carts and recycling paper products, bottles, etc. They 
are targeted by the municipalities and often have their carts confiscated. Tarlabaşı was 
the home to hubs for many of these recyclers, often basement apartments where they 
sort  and  categorize  their  haul.  Many  of  them  have  been  forced  out  by  the  recent 
demolitions.116
Street art, which serves to function as a means to articulate creative and political 
expression by using the urban landscape as medium, is in this case co-opted by the 
authorities and used to turn what was once a residential street into a temporary museum 
exhibit. The buildings, which lost their prior function due to the demolitions are further 
dislocated from their present reality when they are covered with street art. The viewers 
113 Erisa Dautaj Şenerdem, “Contradicting Figures Provided on Istanbul's Tarlabaşı 
Project,” Hürriyet Daily News, October 30, 2010, Accessed May 19, 2013 
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of  the  exhibition  are  separated  from  the  violence  and  displacement  inherent  in 
demolition  by  the  art  that  renders  the  devastated  facades  somehow  renewed  and 
reinterpretable as a canvas, perhaps even conveying messages of resistance. 
Figure 4.1 Tarlabaşı Recycler (Source: author's photograph)
Any hope for resistance or criticism, however, is impossible in such a gesture. 
How subversive  can  street  art  be  when  it  involves  adorning  the  walls  of  buildings 
brought down by a municipality, in a festival sponsored by the same municipality? The 
festival  stages  a  performance which  acts  out  the  fantasy that  destruction  can create 
opportunities for new creation. The participants, organizers and spectators of the festival 
were by and large not residents of the neighborhood, so it cannot be justifiably claimed 
that  the  event  was  orchestrated  for  the  benefit  of  the  neighboring  residents  of  its 
location.
The recycler is longed for and memorialized, although the painter (and likely the 
viewers) fail to remember that it is via the demolition of their homes and workplaces 
that made it possible to paste a stencil of the recycler's likeness on the wall of a building 
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she may have once lived in or utilized as a workspace Mere blocks away, on Tarlabaşı  
Boulevard,  several large walls of scaffolding cover a large section of the demolition 
area.  They  are  comprised  of  large  computer-generated  images  depicting  the  future 
“renewed” Tarlabaşı, showing a chic, affluent quarter, lined with office buildings and 
cafes catering to an ostensibly prosperous demographic, the residents and consumers 
that are projected to  descend upon Tarlabaşı. 
Figure 4.2 Scaffolding surrounding the Tarlabaşı demolition zone (Source: author's photograph)
The streets are tidy and lined with cars and smartly-dressed people, shuffling 
between  the  sparkling  brand-new  offices  and  restaurants.   One  wall  of  scaffolding 
encourages potential buyers to check out the real estate office directly across the street, 
where GAP Inşaat, the construction company facilitating the demolitions (a company 
which is under the umbrella of Çalık Holding, the CEO of which is the son-in law of  
Prime  Minister  Erdoğan117)  exhibits  potential  investment  opportunities  for  those 
awaiting  to  weave  themselves  into  the  “up  and  coming”  area.  The  images  on  the 
117 Constanze Letsch and Jonathan Lewis,  “Turkey: Trying to Balance Urban Renewal 
and Residents' Rights,” Eurasianet, July 18, 2011, Accessed May 8, 2013  
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63858
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scaffolding act as perhaps the most evocative symbol of the inevitable displacement that 
characterizes  many of  the  so-called  urban  renewal  projects  taking place  in  Istanbul 
today. 
 Authorities,  developers  and investors do not  consider the  inner-city  to  be  an 
affordable option for the urban poor. Residents of Tarlabaşı are depicted as criminals 
and are subsequently evicted from their homes, which are demolished with a revanchist  
character that seeks to evoke territorial conquest. The facades of hundreds of mostly 19th 
century buildings of Tarlabaşı were preserved and will likely be remodeled in a pseudo-
historic fashion, ironically edifying the historic quality of the original architectural style. 
Perplexingly, the area will be upsold using “historical” as an enticing adjective, despite 
the area bearing no traces of its original population.The chic apartments and offices that 
will  be  constructed  within  these  facades  also  seek  to  whitewash  the  heterogenous 
existence of Tarlabaşı's current inhabitants.  
4.2 Sulukule
Law No. 5366 was also successful in staging a total transformation of Sulukule, 
a historic Roma neighborhood located near the old city walls. The history of Sulukule, 
which prior to its annihilation was the oldest Roma community in Europe, dates to the 
11th century. That particular law in 2005, under an agreement between the district and 
city municipalities, and TOKI (Turkey's Mass Housing Agency) set the stage for the 
demolition of Sulukule, in favor of the creation of what Kevin Robins refers to as a 
“marketable, modern version of neo-traditional neighborhood.”118 
The initial revanchist assault on Sulukule began in the early 90’s. The area was 
known for  its  entertainment  houses,  which  provided many jobs  for  its  residents,  as 
musicians,  dancers,  waiters,  cooks  etc.  These  entertainment  houses  were  famed 
throughout  Istanbul  and  were  popular  tourist  attractions.  These  houses  came  under 
attack by a district police chief who raided them and assaulted the working musicians. 
118 Kevin Robins, “How Tell What Remains: Sulukule Nevermore,” Cultural Politics 7 
no. 1 (2011):19. 
44
37 entertainment houses were closed shortly thereafter.119 
Around the same time, the chief of security and eventual  mayor of Istanbul, 
Saadettin Tantaan, claimed that the entertainment houses were morally degenerate and 
closed all of them down by 1994.  The quarter suffered dire economic consequences as 
a result of the overnight disappearance of its main source of employment.120 
Sulukule's  undoing  was  brought  upon  by  the  previously  mentioned 
'development' initiative that arose under Law No. 5366. Sulukule residents who owned 
their homes were given the option to buy properties in the future development, although 
very few could afford to do so. The neighborhood’s renters were offered apartments in 
Taşoluk, a new district built under the authority of TOKI located 45 kilometres away 
from the city center. Demolitions occurred between 2007-2009, and in that period, the 
residents who had moved to Taşoluk realized that not only were there no jobs in the area 
and they could not continue to pay the inflated rental prices for very long. All of the  
residents who had moved to the peripheral settlement eventually moved from Taşoluk. 
By 2009, almost all  of the former Sulukule was demolished, and the name Sulukule 
itself was erased, as the neighborhood was reappropriated into a bordering district.121
Prime Minister Erdoğan referred to the demolitions as a process of “clearing 
away the monstrosity.”122 Such comments correspond to a latent contempt for not just 
the architecture and physical attributes of the neighborhood, but also for the people who 
live there. They also lead one to believe that the PM considers any poor neighborhood 
with  shabby  housing  to  be  unfit  and  undesirable  for  today's  Istanbul.  This  kind  of 
commentary,  coming  from a  such  a  powerful  source,  surely  has  the  possibility  of 
influencing public  perception  of  an area.  They also expose  the vested  interests  that 
Erdoğan  ostensibly  holds  with  regards  to  Istanbul.  It  would  seem odd  for  say,  the 
German Prime Minister to weigh in on a certain neighborhood of Hamburg, or for an 
American president to voice distaste for a particular neighborhood in New York City. 
119  Hacer Foggo, “The Sulukule Affair: Roma Against Expropriation,” Roma Rights 
Quarterly 4 (2007):41.
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122 Ozan Karaman and Tolga Islam, “On the Dual Nature of Intra-Urban Borders,” 
Cities 29 no. 4 (2011): 3.
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By 2011, properties where age-old Roma households once stood became construction 
sites for “Ottoman-style” apartments and offices, the prices of which are advertised at 
nearly ten times the rate at which the Roma were forced to sell their homes.123 
The gaudy apartment buildings that have begun to spring up amongst the ashes 
of Sulukule constitute a rejection of  Roma history through the puzzling application of 
“historical preservation.” The latter is conceived of by politicians and developers as a 
means  to  obliterate  what  they  consider  improper,  undesirable,  alien.  An  abstracted 
definition of the historical is then proposed to justify the systematic extinguishing of a 
vibrant culture by flattening its physical and communal infrastructure. The concept of 
pseudo-Ottoman architecture sitting side by side the walls of the old city presents a 
near-sighted attempt at the redrawing of a historical narrative, one that correlates with 
the reappropriation of central areas  and the newly emerging capital that follows. 
Figure  4.3 Fatih  Municipality  Mayor  stands  outside  Neo-Ottoman apartment buildings in  the former  
Sulukule (Source: Today's Zaman) 
Sulukule  remains  a  space  of  contestation.  In  June  2012,  Istanbul's  4th 
Administrative Court ordered a halt in the construction of the luxurious quasi-historical 
apartments.  The  decision  was  seen  as  a  victory  by  architects,  planners  and  Roma 
123  Constanze  Letsch, “Turkish Roma Make Way For Property Developers in Historic 
Istanbul District,” The Guardian, Nov. 11 2011, Accessed December 12, 2012 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/09/sulukule-roma-housing-row-istanbul 
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activists who had been fiercely critical of the quarter's aggressive redevelopment from 
its inception.124 In spite of the court's decision, however, a lottery for new housing in the 
area  took place  merely  weeks later,  suggesting  that  construction would  continue as 
planned. The Fatih District Mayor noted that the vast majority of the construction had 
already been completed anyway.125
In  March  of  2013,  TOKI  announced  that  it  planned  to  restore  24  historic 
buildings that remained standing in the former Sulukule.126 These buildings were likely 
among the few that were not demolished. These buildings, which once housed Roma 
residents that were forcibly displaced from the soil that has been associated with their 
culture  for  nearly  a  millenium  undergo  an  extremely  reprehensible  process  of 
musealization. Although the Roma population was entirely removed, as was the name 
Sulukule,  a  name  synonymous  with  Roma  culture  and  history,  the  authorities  and 
developers still seek to recreate some sort of ambiguous historical motif. 
The  new  settlement,  which  will  feature  Ottoman-style  luxury  apartments 
juxtaposed among the two dozen Roma buildings, which will be restored appropriately 
for their musealization. The goal is to create a historical atmosphere that is desirable to 
the future tenants and owners in the former Sulukule. These future residents will enjoy 
the presence of the restored Sulukule “heritage” buildings, without having to interact 
with  the  people  who  until  very  recently  called  them home.  The  Roma,  who  were 
constructed as an undesireable and problematic community, had to be removed for the 
new settlement to be realized. Their restored former homes will be loosely perceived as 
historical, but their legacy and history is written out of the landscape. The presence of 
these restored buildings, severed from their context,  will  conceal the non-consensual 
manner in which the Roma were forced out of home of 1000 years. 
The area is  “re-claimed” as a  historically  preserved site,  although the  “Neo-
124  Elif Ince, “Court Rules Against New Sulukule Villas,” Hürriyet Daily News, June 
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Ottoman” buildings that are soon to the dominant architectural style were never a part of 
the historical fabric of the neighborhood in the first place.  As Kevin Robins puts it: 
“Fatih Municipality has a different story for the district, harking back to a vague-to-
mock nineteenth-century Ottoman legacy for the Sulukule neighborhood. UNESCO et 
al deal in the world heritage business—both tangible and intangible, as they choose to 
categorize their own historical domain.”127
127 Robins, “How Tell What Remains,” 36.
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CHAPTER 5.
CONTESTED PUBLIC SPACE 
Public space, according to Neil Smith and Setha Low can range from “the street, 
the  park,  the  media,  the  Internet,  the  shopping  mall,  the  United  Nations,  national 
governments  and  local  neighborhoods.”  It  “envelops  the  palpable  tension  between 
place,  experienced  at  all  scales  in  daily  life,  and  the  seeming  spacelessness  of  the 
Internet,  popular  opinion,  and  global  institution  sand  economy” and  “includes  very 
recognizeable geographies of daily movement, which may be local, regional or global, 
but they also include electronic and institutional “spaces” that are every bit as palpable, 
if experienced quite differently, in daily life.”128 
Low  and  Smith  distinguish  from  the  term  “public  sphere”  popularized  by 
Habermas, in which “the ideal public sphere is deemed universal and thereby, in any 
meaningful sense, spatially undifferentiated.” Furthermore, the public and private often 
overlap and in various situations one can observe private management of public space 
as well as public oversight of private space.129
David  Harvey  refers  to  the  case  of  Paris  in  the  mid-19th century,  where  the 
working  class  contested  “bourgeois  hegemony”  by  conferring  in  a  vast  network  of 
private  spaces  such  as  bars  and  restaurants  ignored  by the  upper  classes.  “Seeping 
outward from their own symbiotic fashioning of public, commercial, and private spaces, 
popular  forces  more  and  more  asserted  a  public  and  collective  presence  on  the 
boulevards of bourgeois Paris.”130  For Harvey, “public space counts for little or nothing 
politically unless it connects symbiotically with the organization of institutional (in this 
128 Neil Smith and Setha Low, “Introduction:The Imperative of Public Space,” in The 
Politics of Public Space ed. Neil Smith and Setha Low (New York:Routledge, 2006), 
3. 
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130 David Harvey, “The Political Economy of Public Space,” in The Politics of Public 
Space ed. Neil Smith and Setha Low (New York:Routledge, 2006), 29.
49
case, commercial, although in other cases it may be religious or educational institutions) 
and private spaces.”131 
This issue of symbiosis over spaces in the public and private realms as well as 
the influence and power that one often holds over other are both important ideas to 
consider regarding the issues discussed in this chapter. 
Mike Davis, in an article entitled “Fortress Los Angeles: The Militarization of 
Urban  Space”,  describes  the  disparity  of  public  space  access  in  the  'ghetto'  of  Los 
Angeles, which is “defined not only by its paucity of parks and public amenities, but 
also by the fact that it is not wired into any of the key information circuits.”132 On the 
other  hand:  “the affluent  Westside is  plugged—often  at  public  expense—into  dense 
networks of  educational  and cultural  media.”133  Davis  argues  that  such a polarized 
urban reality signifies the end of what he calls the “Olmstedian vison of public space in 
America”,  referring  to  Frederick  Law  Olmsted,  the  creator  of  New  York's  famous 
Central Park, who believed that the park should be a space where people from different 
ethnic and class backgrounds could coxist harmoniously.134  Davis' account Los Angeles 
in  the  1990's  portrays  a  city  redirecting  taxes  from public  spaces  and  recreational 
amenities to privatized locales, which are championed using positivist rhetoric in order 
to disguise the “brutalization of its inner-city neighborhoods and the stark divisions of 
class and race represented in its built environment.135 
Public  space  has  been  a  contested  issue  in  Istanbul  in  recent  years.  In  the 
summer of 2011, residents of Istanbul were dismayed to discover that outdoor tables 
and chairs  throughout  Beyoğlu had disappeared.  Although the outdoor  tables  of the 
meyhanes in the famous Nevizade quarter remained, they were confiscated elsewhere. 
Many  restaurants  and  bars  placed  tables  and  chairs  outside  their  establishments 
throughout various pockets of Beyoğlu, such as in Asmalımescit and Küçük Beyoğlu, 
131 Ibid., 30.
132 Mike Davis, “Fortress Los Angeles:The Militarization of Urban Space,” in 
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which were popular especially in the warmer months. Authorities seized the tables and 
chairs  while  many  customers  were  actually  sitting  down.  Business  owners  and 
customers alike complained of police harassment, adding that much of the furniture was 
broken.136 
The Beyoğlu Municipality,  on the other hand,  argued that  the  crackdown on 
outdoor seating was a necessary response to establishments using customers as “human 
shields” in a “street invasion”, where proprietors had taken advantage of outdoor space 
in light a recent ban on indoor smoking. 
Rumors began circulating that the real reason for the ban was due to a situation 
involving  Prime  Minister  Erdoğan  stuck  in  traffic  on  a  crowded  Asmalimescit 
backstreet. Patrons noticed Erdoğan and raised their glasses to him in a mock toast, 
which supposedly angered the prime minister enough to inspire him to push for the ban. 
This  was  not  the  first  time  that  Beyoğlu's  outdoor  eating  and  drinking 
establishments were targeted. In 1994, shortly following the victory of the Welfare Party 
in local elections, the mayor removed outdoor tables in Beyoğlu, claiming that the space 
should be available for  those  unable to  afford to eat  at  such establishments to  pass 
through. Critics, however, perceived the initiative as an attack on public space.137 
The 2011 ban is relevant to analyze regardless of the official or actual reason. 
Although the narrow alleyways of tables and chairs throughout Beyoğlu don't constitute 
public space in the purest sense, they collectively function as a space for thousands of 
people to meet and socialize together outside in a highly centralized and busy area. As 
such,  they  resemble  the  symbiotic  relationship  that  private  and  public  spaces  often 
share, as described by Harvey. The outdoor seating found by establishments in usually 
concentrated areas of Istanbul are where specific locations blend and the lines between 
public and private space are blurred. Such attacks on this form of socialization, which 
seeks  to  restrict  assembly  and  movement,  work  alongside  greater  initiatives  of 
encroachment that require the implementation of musealization.
136 “Municipal Patrol Acts Harshly Towards Patrons Say Restaurant Owners” Hürriyet 
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5.1 Taksim Square, Taksim Gezi Park and the Topçu Barracks
The re-creation (and simultaneous musealization) of urban space is reflected by 
the Taksim Gezi Park Project. The project, announced by Prime Minister Erdoğan prior 
to the last election, seeks, supposedly, to pedestrianize Taksim Square, Istanbul's most 
prominent  and  central  public  space,  by  removing  bus  stops  and  redirecting  traffic 
underground tunnels. The project was quickly passed through the official channels and 
involved no public consultation, this in spite of the fact that it will be funded by taxes. 
The plan also includes the closing of Taksim Gezi Park, a large park located just 
behind the square, in fact the only green space in its vicinity. The park is slated to be 
replaced  by  a  reconstruction  of  the  Topçu  Barracks,  which  were  built  in  1806  but 
demolished in 1940 during a renovation of the square. This segment of the project was 
cancelled in January 2013 by the Cultural Assets Preservation Board due to a lack of 
sufficient  archival  documentation  to  reconstruct  the  building.138 However,  in  March 
2013, the High Council for Protection of Cultural and Natural Assets, which holds final 
decision-making  ability  in  such  matters,  opted  to  reject  the  cancellation  and  move 
forward with the reconstruction. 139
138 “Minister Confirms Cancellation of Topçu Barracks Replica Project,” Today's 
Zaman, January 18, 2013, Accessed January 20, 2013 
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Figure 5.1 Digital image of the Taksim Square and Gezi Park redevelopment project (Source: 
Istanbul Municipality) 
The  project  involves  the  resurrection  of  a  once  significant  object  from  the 
dustbin  of  history,  by  implicitly  invoking  it  with  the  historical  relevance  it  once 
possessed. However, the reconstruction seeks to remove the building from function and 
context,  musealizing  it  in  a  thinly  veiled  attempt  to  historicize  the  continued 
proliferation of “cultural” centres which inevitably become centres for consumption. 
 The aim here is to valorize the history of the Taksim Barracks (which bear both 
Imperial and Republican connections) while underwriting the history of the park that 
took its place. If the project is realized and the Barracks are reconstructed, what will be 
the effects on collective memory in, say 200 years? Connections between the Barracks 
in their functional form and their future symbolic form would have been forged (if only 
through aesthetic means) and the fact  that a park ever existed in  that space will  be 
forgotten. 
Şükrü Aslan offers the following comments regarding Taksim Square's political 
history in light of this project:  “Taksim Square is  not an ordinary square.  The 1977 
killings of dozens of people at May Day celebrations there has given a political identity 
to Taksim Square. To keep alive the political image in the minds of people walking by 
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Taksim is also a requirement for our political confrontation with the past.”140 
Baykan and Hatuka stress that the meydan (Turkish for 'square') is a separate 
concept and bears different attributes than those of the typical public square. The latter 
is built in the open, albeit  in the midst of other buildings, allowing for considerable 
security  and  control  within  the  space  of  the  square  itself.  The  meydan,  however, 
functions in the opposite fashion, as a buffer between various spaces, inhibiting control 
and enabling pedestrian flow. As such, the conceptual difference should be understood 
“in order to understand the history of this space, not as a fixed concrete form but as to 
how it opened itself to different forms and representations, and to people's right to be 
there.141 
On  May  Day  1977,  a  bloody  and  tragic  attack  occurred  amidst  a  crowd of 
400,000  demonstrators.  Following  his  speech,  the  president  of  a  workers  union 
confederation  asked  for  a  minute  of  silence  for  those  who  had  died  struggling  for 
workers'  rights.  In  the  midst  of  that  silence,  shots  were  fired,  which  were  quickly 
followed by deployment of police cars blaring loud sirens, which prompted mass panic. 
34  people  were  killed  from  the  gunshots  and  due  to  being  crushed  by  the  crowd 
stampede as well as the police vehicles.142
As  a  result  of  this  tragedy,  Baykan  and  Hatuka  conclude:  “no  matter  how 
temporary the apppropriation was, or how permanently its traces were eradicated, the 
very fact of the existence of the demonstration on 1 May 1977, with the memories and 
associations it evokes, has permanently changed the face of Taksim Square.”143
Taksim Square bears a profound political history and continues to be the most 
visible, central, and popular public space for protests and demonstrations. The proposed 
rebuilding  of  the  Taksim  Barracks  and  associated  pedestrianization  seeks  to 
decontextualize the square by drastically altering its spatial reality in an attempt to sever 
the  ties  with  both  its  political  history  and  its  present  use  as  a  space  for  mass 
140 Bahar Çuhadar, “Experts Call for Debate Before Changing Taksim Square,” 
Hürriyet Daily News, January 22, 2011, Accessed January 20, 2013 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=experts-warn-for-public-debate-
before-any-change-to-taksim-square-2011-01-20 
141 Ayşegül Baykan and Tali Hatuka, “Politics and Culture in the Making of Public 
Space,” Planning Perspectives 25 no. 1 (2010):51-52. 
142 Ibid., 62-63.
143 Ibid., 63.
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demonstration. 
The current initiative in Taksin Square is entangled within a greater scheme of 
reducing access to public space. According to prominent architects, the project coincides 
with a plan to construct a new public square, across the Golden Horn below the historic 
peninsula in Yenikapı. Istanbul's Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning approved 
the plan in October of 2012. Architect Korhan Gümüş offers the following comments on 
the recently approved project:
They are going to tear down Taksim Square [in central Istanbul] and build a 
closed  meeting  area  away  from  the  [urban]  centre  and  under  supervision. 
Severing the connection between the meeting area and the city was what they 
had always wanted to do up till now. [Demonstration] meetings take place in 
squares  that  open up to  the  city's  streets.  Everyone  makes it  to  the  area  by 
walking there. According to this project, however, everyone will arrive in the 
meeting area via mass transportation and hold their  demonstration in a well-
controlled area. No one will see it or hear about it.144
Further  controversy  ensued  in  the  days  leading  up  to  May  1st,  when  Prime 
Minister Erdoğan announced at a party meeting that the Topçu Barracks construction 
would include a shopping mall and residential  area. This directly contrasted Istanbul 
Mayor Topbas's statement months earlier, where the mayor insisted that a cultural center 
and art gallery, not a mall, was in the works. Ironically, in the same speech, Erdoğan 
rebuked  archaelogists  and  conservationists  who  had  slowed  down  the  Marmaray 
project,  an ambitious  project  that  seeks to build an underwater  rail  line beneath the 
Bosphorus, linking the European and Anatolian sides of Istanbul. The Prime Minister 
criticized those who wish to properly excavate “some pottery items” while ignoring the 
historical importance of the barracks.145 
The irony of  such a statement exposes  the relationship that  the political  and 
financial  elite  share  with  the  notion  of  historical  preservation.  The  prime  minister 
apparently  considers  the  Byzantine-era  archaeological  discoveries  unearthed  via  the 
Marmaray  project  construction  neglible.  At  the  same time  he  seeks  to  valorize  the 
144 Nilay Vardar, “Ministry Approves Coastal Project Next to UNESCO Heritage Site,” 
Bianet, October 22, 2012, Accessed December 12, 2012 http://bianet.org/english/human-
rights/141605-ministry-approves-coastal-project-next-to-unesco-heritage-site
145 Ipek Üzüm “Plans Voiced by PM for Mall at New Taksim Barracks Draw 
Criticisms,” Hürriyet Daily News , April 30, 2013, Accessed May 16, 2013  
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historical  significance of the barracks, although the former represent  valid  historical 
artefacts, while the latter is an initiative tied up in a pseudo-historical effort to recreate a 
a facility that was demolished decades earlier. 
The  authorities  see  history  as  something  to  be  used  as  a  means  to  further 
political and economic initiatives, and if history happens to get in the way of a certain 
project,  then it  can be circumstantially  deemed unimportant.  Musealization is  a key 
tactic in valorizing the historical significance of an object or building in order to justify 
the confiscation of public space and/or the proliferation of consumption spaces. In this 
case  it  is  involved  in  both,  and  occurs  alongside  the  rejection  of  valid  historic 
preservation initiatives. 
Another controversy surrounding the Taksim Square pedestrianization element 
of  project occurred when it was announced that May Day celebrations would not be 
allowed in Taksim Square, allegedly because the pedestrianization project rendered the 
area unsuitable for public demonstration. This was compounded by the cancellation of 
various transit services for May 1st, including the city's metrobus, funicular line, two 
subway lines, and numerous ferry lines.146 It is no surprise that access to the area was 
barred on a day like May 1st, yet in spite of the construction Taksim is still open and 
accessible(albeit compounded by walls, barricades, and other materials surrounding the 
construction) otherwise.  The  rather comprehensive transit cut shows no concern for the 
fact that thousands of people will be hindered or prevented from going to work. 
On May 1st groups of workers and activists who had assembled in other districts 
with the intent to walk to the closed square were attacked by police who deployed tear  
gas and water cannons. Several demonstrators were injured including a 17-year old girl 
who was  hospitalized  in  critical  condition  after  a  gas  canister  hit  her  in  the  head. 
Following harsh criticism of the violent response of the police from various groups as 
well as the main opposition party, Istanbul Governor Hüseyin Avni Mutlu defended the 
actions  of  the  police,  saying  it  was necessary  and  justified  while  claiming  that  the 
injured 17-year old was a “radical.”147
146“Debates on May Day in Taksim Rekindled After Era of Peaceful Celebration,” 
Today's Zaman, April 30 2013, Accessed May 16, 2013 http://todayszaman.com/news-
314076-.html 
147 “Istanbul Governor Defends Crackdowns on May Day,” Hürriyet Daily News, May 
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Even though the marchers had not even begun to approach Taksim Square, its 
closure was used as a pretext to stifle May Day demonstrations. This is indicated by the 
police taking action against marchers in districts like Beşiktaş and Şişli. The marchers 
were not even given the opportunity to march to the square. 
In late May 2013, bulldozers began to uproot trees in Taksim Gezi Park, which 
prompted several days of massive protests in the park with thousands of participants. 
The  protests  lasted  until  morning  with  many  demonstrators  camping  at  the  park 
overnight in tents. On the morning of May 31st, the remaining protestors were brutally  
attacked by police who deployed tear gas, sprayed water and burned tents. The brutality 
continued throughout the day  as demonstrators peacefully assembling in Taksim Square 
and on Istiklal Avenue were met with police attacks. In addition to the tear gas, another 
chemical  was sprayed liberally  by police  vehicles  that  burned the  eyes and skin of 
protestors.  Numerous videos and photographs captured  the  police  violence that  was 
dealt  without  provocation.  Protests  continued  throughout  Istanbul  (where  protestors 
numbered in the hundreds of thousand) and in many Turkish cities. The first several 
days  of  demonstrations  were  hardly  covered  in  the  mainstream  Turkish  television 
media,  although  social  media  was  used  to  spread  the  word  internationally,  which 
resulted in numerous solidarity demonstrations all over the world. The quality of the 
protests were primarily peaceful and numerous groups stood side by side, calling for 
Prime  Minister  Erdogan's  resignation,  decrying police  violence,  demanding that  the 
park remain a park, and an end to the privatization of public space and green space. 
Following the erection of numerous barricades in the surrounding area, which 
made it inaccessible to police, the park itself took on the role of an autonomous zone, 
where  protestors  installed  free  mobile  cafes,  clinics  and  even  a  library.  Volunteers 
circulated  through  the  park,  collecting  trash  and  handing  out  sandwiches,  masks, 
medical supplies and water. The police re-entered the park just over a week later, seizing 
control and again exhibiting excessive force. Throughout these events, the government 
utilized aggressive rhetoric and employed a variety tactics in an attempt to delegitimze 
the  demonstrations.  (For  example,  Erdoğan repeatedly  claimed that  protestors  drank 
alcohol  in  a  mosque that  had been temporarily converted to  a  clinic.  The mosque's 
3, 2013, Accessed May 3, 2013 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/istanbul-governor-defends-
crackdown-on-may-day.aspx?pageID=238&nID=46136&NewsCatID=341 (
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muezzin  denied  this  claim.)148 As  of  this  writing,  large  protests  continued  to  occur 
regularly in Istanbul, many of which were met with fierce police intervention. Forums 
began  to  take  place  nightly  at  parks  throughout  the  city,  and  other  creative 
demonstrations  (including  groups  of  people  standing  silently)  were  witnessed  in 
Istanbul and throughout the country.
Expression of identity and political will are closely linked to the access of public 
space, since an accessible and central area for organizing protests and demonstrations is 
essential to conveying the presence and interests of particular groups. Taksim Square is 
the  artery  by  which  various  groups  are  able  to  express  their  concerns  and  spread 
awareness. In the past year the square has been the starting point for demonstrations of 
various  unions,  LGBT  groups,  and  numerous  other  groups  representing  various 
identities. By assembling at the square and continuing down Istiklal Avenue, even small 
movements are able to  gain the attention of thousands of passerbys as well as that of 
the media, partially due to the fact that large groups of police are usually dispatched to 
monitor the event. Removing pedestrian access from Taksim Square and confining it on 
the other side of the Golden Horn threatens to take away the visibility that such groups 
are able to attain.
Taksim Gezi  Park,  as  the only green space  in  a dense  district,  is  an equally 
important public asset. It is the only open space in the area free from the associations of 
consumption. The massive demonstrations surrounding the uprooting of trees reflected a 
large group of people representing varous backgrounds and political beliefs, bonded by 
the evident  assault  that had been carried out against not  just the right to peacefully 
assemble and utilize public space.  The redevelopment of the square,  in conjunction 
with the demolition of Taksim Gezi Park in favor of a consumption zone disguised as a 
historic  military barracks is a two-part  scheme that deliberately seeks to seize these 
assets from the public. This project, which sought to implement a specific vision and 
privatize  an  important  public  space,  was  heavily  contested  by  various  segments  of 
society,  who articulated their demands clearly. A June 6th court ruling, the details of 
148 “Muezzin of Mosque Where PM Claims Alcohol was Consumed Questioned by 
Police,” June 27, 2012, Accessed June 28, 2013 http://www.todayszaman.com/news-
319410-muezzin-of-mosque-where-pm-claims-alcohol-was-consumed-questioned-
by-police.html
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which were revealed on July 3rd, cancelled the reconstruction of the barracks as well as 
the greater pedestrianization project.149 It remains to be seen if the Prime Minister will 
respect the decision.
This case illustrates two of the three main themes in this thesis, encroachment 
upon public space and (attempted) proliferation of consumption spaces. The protests 
that occurred in Istanbul and throughout the country (the catalyst of which were the 
uprooting  of  trees  in  Taksim Gezi  Park)  show that  the musealization  of  the  former 
Topçu Barracks sparked widespread outrage at what many saw as yet another attempt to 
implement a frivolous project that would fail to benefit  public interest.  This project, 
which sought to implement a specific vision and privatize public space, was heavily 
contested by various segments of society, who clearly articulated their demands.
  
149 “Court Decision Cancels Taksim Artillery Barracks Project that Triggered Gezi 
Protests,” Hürriyet Daily News, July 3, 2013, Accessed July 7, 2013  
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 CONCLUSIONS
As Istanbul continues to gain popularity as a tourist destination and as a major 
financial centre, the marketing of heritage, history, and identity becomes a paramount 
consideration. Within this context, Ayfer Bartu's concluding remarks in a 2001 article 
are just as relevant a decade later:
 “Globalization is inscribed within particular localities and is reworked within 
particular  social,  cultural  and  historical  contexts.  Within  this  framework, 
heritage and the politics of the past take on a very different meaning, and which 
past  to  preserve  and  market,  and  whom  to  market  it  to,  become  political 
questions.  Cities,  as  physical  embodiments  of  histories,  become crucial  sites 
where different claims to the past are formulated and contested'150 
 
The foreign press constantly uses binaries and clichés when describing Turkey, 
especially in reference to its largest city. It is routinely billed as the place where East and  
West meet, where tradition and modernity clash, where secularism and piety wage it out 
on  the  streets.  These  descriptions  are  all  grossly  simplistic  and imply  that  the  city 
possesses a neatly torn identity, one that is caught between two opposing forces, in the 
dead  centre  between two poles.  Turkish politicians  often  recycle  the  same binaries, 
reducing the rich history of the city to a dichotomous narrative. Istanbul, where identity 
has  been  contested  time  and  time  again  prior  to  and  since  the  foundation  of  the 
Republic, occupies multiple realities that formulate a web of its complex image. As the 
city grows in age and in size, its collects and displays the struggles for its most pivotal  
monuments, avenues, and quarters, especially in Beyoğlu. Although the quarter (like 
Istanbul itself) has fallen in and out of favour over the years, it has now re-emerged as  
the apple of the eye of the financial and political elites. The gentrification of quarters 
like Cihangir and Galata cemented that fact in the 90's and 2000's, while the Fransız 
Sokağı affair and the top-down, deliberately executed gentrification of Tarlabaşı reveal 
that Beyoğlu is being redeveloped as a space for the elite and wealthy. 
In  recent  years,  “Neo-Ottoman”  has  emerged  as  a  popular  buzzword  for 
describing both the domestic and foreign policy of the ruling AKP, postulating that the 
150 Bartu, “Rethinking Heritage Politics in a Global Context,” 153-54.
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party harbours nostalgia for the Ottoman past and is actively attempting to recreate an 
imperial  setting  in  the  21st century.  Are  the  AKP  truly  attempting  to  resurrect  a 
semblance  of  Ottoman  heritage  in  the  city?  In  my opinion,  yes  and  no.  There  are 
certainly  numerous  instances  of  the  reintroduction  of  Ottoman  themes  into  the 
architectural  framework  of  the  city.  The  Topçu  Barracks  project  clearly  exhibits 
Ottoman nostalgia, as the barracks were a fixture of Ottoman times. The construction of 
so-called  Neo-Ottoman luxury apartment  buildings  in  Sulukule  also attest  to  such a 
vision. 
While Ottoman nostalgia certainly is alive and well among a significant throng 
of political and financial elites, asserting that the creation of a “Neo-Ottoman” city is 
among their highest aspirations is exaggerated. They are simply attempting to create an 
Istanbul  that  functions  according  to  the  maximization  of  their  benefits  and  the 
valorization of their image. Reintroducing Ottoman themes and styles may be helpful as 
a means to an end, but that it is ultimately based less in heritage and more in political 
and economic control. Other themes explored in this thesis attest to a manipulation of 
history that is opportunistic rather than consistent.  Such control is maximized by the 
cleansing of inner-city districts, transforming quarters occupied by marginalized groups 
into lucrative real estate opportunities, and by encroaching upon public space in order to 
deny  the  platform  for  various  groups  to  assert  their  presence  and  express  their 
grievances. 
Musealization is implemented in Istanbul today quite frequently by authorities, 
developers,  and  other  actors  in  order  to  justify  non-consensual  projects  and 
decontextualize the urban space on which these projects are taking place. The upper 
echelon of wealthy and powerful political actors and financiers are rapidly restructuring 
Istanbul,  (particularly  Beyoğlu)  demolishing  certain  buildings,  erecting  others,  and 
implementing  projects  that  seem to possess  two goals:  maximizing their  own profit 
margins, and suppressing identities seen as undesirable, and/or politically problematic. 
As  these  maneuevers  have  been  orchestrated  quickly  and  entirely  without  consent, 
musealization as urban strategy has been implemented in order to coat a hazy historical 
glaze over the proceedings,  diverting attention away from the profound violence and 
permanence of the consequences. 
One of the most profound changes in Turkey since the Republic's inception has 
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been its rapid urbanization. Especially within the past decade, Turkey has taken on the 
image of a regional powerhouse with a growing economy. This is no more evident than 
in Istanbul,  where the construction of new high-rises, chain stores, luxury apartment 
buildings and extravagant shopping malls seem to have no limit. Istanbul is known most 
famously for its historical sights. The city is home to architectural gems spanning the 
Byzantine and Ottoman Empires. Beyoğlu, and particularly Tarlabaşı still display a high 
concentration  of  late  19th/early  20th century  architecture.  Nevertheless,  the  layered 
historic charm of the city is being overshadowed by the glitzy imposition of sparkly-
white capitalist modernity. 
The ancient city looks newer than ever, in spite of the quasi-historical coating 
that  is  often applied.  Spaces such as the Demirören Mall  and the resurrected Topçu 
Barracks are seductive insofar as this quasi-historical layer is applied in order to mask 
the fact that these places are nothing more than ordinary zones of consumption.  As 
Turkey's  urban population continues to  rise,  the  most  centrally-located urban spaces 
increase  in  desirability.  This  increase  perpetuates  the  contestation  of  these  spaces, 
especially when they are characterized by dilapidated housing stock occupied by low-
income tenants. 
The profit potential is high, the more so when laws such as Law No.5366 are 
utilized in order to extract property at rates much lower than the actual property value. 
This  maximizes  the  return  when  the  area  is  redeveloped  and  marketed  to  wealthy 
tenants  or  owners.  The  city  suffers,  as  poor  inner-city  residents  are  pushed  to  the 
periphery, creating arcs of poverty on the outskirts while the city centre ceases to be 
accessible to those unable to pay the new prices. As David Harvey puts it: “The right to 
the city, as it is now constituted, is too narrowly confined, restricted in most cases to a 
political and economic elite who are in a position to shape cities more and more after  
their own desire.”151 
Unfortunately,  this continues to become the reality in 21st century Istanbul, a 
reality that does not bode well for the city and its inhabitants, especially those in areas 
such as Tarlabaşı, a quarter characterized by a socially inclusive identity, comprised of 
numerous groups sharing the same space. Many of these people also shared the common 
reality  of  having  moved  to  Tarlabaşı  due  to  the  political,  social  and/or  economic 
151 David Harvey, “Social Justice and the City,” (Athens: University of Georgia Press 
2006), 329.
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circumstances that made it no longer possible to remain in their former country, village, 
or  neighbourhood.  Current  mechanisms  of  urban  transformation  in  Istanbul  and 
throughout Turkey appear hostile to the possibility of creating or sustaining spaces of 
social inclusion. On the contrary, they seek to segregate and atomize, forcing those who 
have already faced significant social and political exclusion to experience additional 
waves of displacement and marginalization. The authorities do not seem to consider 
public  spaces  to  be  important  facet  of  the  urban landcsape,  rather  they  are  seen  as 
expendable  when  a  profitable  opportunity  is  conceived.  However,  the  massive 
demonstrations that erupted throughout Turkey beginning at the end of May 2013 in part  
show that a large segment of the public is no longer willing to stand for urban planning 
projects that are implemented without consultation and harmful to public interest. As of 
this writing, the fate of Gezi Park is still unclear. It is also unclear to what extent the 
power of the ruling party and its top-down style  of urban planning will  actually be 
altered by the current unrest.  For the sake of the city,  one can only hope that these 
events signify a shift in how it is social and structural fabric are treated. 
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